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Chapter 1: The Rise of the Machines and the U.S. Labor Market
1.1 Introduction
Many macroeconomic models assume that the aggregate factor shares of income are
stable over the long run and that business cycles can be treated as independent of economic
growth trends. Both assumptions have been challenged, however, by the structural changes
in the U.S. labor market in the past 30 years.
First of all, the U.S. labor income share has declined relative to capital since the mid-
1980s (Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin, 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; and others). The
headline measure of labor share compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) histor-
ically fluctuated around a mean of 64 percent. Since the mid-1980s, however, aggregate
labor share has been on a mild downward trend, and the decline accelerated notably after
the 2000s to an average of around 58 percent in recent years. Alternative measures of labor
share also suggest a significant, albeit smaller, decline over this period. A declining labor
share has many implications, including declining government tax revenue — as labor is
generally taxed at a higher rate of capital — and changes in responses to monetary policy.
Second, within labor, there has been an increasing divergence between two groups of
workers: those who work in “routine-task-intensive” occupations, such as manufacturing
and clerical jobs, and those who work in “nonroutine-task-intensive” occupations, such as
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professionals and technicians. In the past three decades, both employment and income
shares of routine occupations have declined steadily and significantly relative to those of
nonroutine occupations. Because nonroutine labor includes both the highest-skilled and the
lowest-skilled, this divergence between nonroutine and routine occupations is also known
as a “polarization” in the aggregate labor market along the worker skill-distribution, which
is closely linked to the weakening of the middle class. The disappearance of “routine”
jobs — particularly in the manufacturing sector — and the associated weakening of the
middle class and the rise in income and wealth inequality have far-reaching implications
on the shape and welfare of the macroeconomy, and have been front and center in the recent
political debate.
What are the driving forces behind these structural changes in the U.S labor market? A
prominent candidate is technological progress. The structural shifts from routine to non-
routine labor and from labor to capital coincide with the so-called “second machine age,”
as advances in computer and Information Technology (IT) have led to an increasing pace
of automation, causing disruptions in the workplace (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014).
Economists have largely agreed that “routine-biased” technological change, such as com-
puterization and IT progress, is one of the main driving forces behind the decline of routine
occupations relative to nonroutine occupations. (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003; Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson, 2015; Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014; and others). However, it is
still an open question whether technology has also contributed to the decline of the overall
labor share relative to capital (Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin, 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman,
2014), and if so, to what extent and whether the trend will continue. In this study, I seek to
answer these questions both qualitatively and quantitatively.
2
The second assumption that most macroeconomic models rely on is the dichotomy be-
tween long-run economic growth and short-run business cycles. However, there is strong
evidence that recent business cycles in the U.S. are not independent from long-run growth
trends. More specifically, the decline of routine employment since the 1980s has not been
a gradual process; instead, it has taken a “stepwise” shape, with nearly all of the long-term
downward adjustments occurring within a 3-year window around each recession. This
concentration of trend adjustments in recessions, in turn, has caused some “anomalies” in
the cyclical behavior of the labor market. For each of the three most recent U.S. reces-
sions (1990-91, 2001, and 2007-09), employment and total hours lagged behind output for
more than a year during the recovery, giving rise to unprecedented “jobless recoveries”.
Jaimovich and Siu (2012) suggest that the majority of the job loss in recessions and ensu-
ing weak recoveries during this period can be traced back to the trend decline of routine
labor. This is not surprising as cyclical fluctuations of business conditions and short-run
market imperfections can significantly distort the timing and the magnitudes of medium-
run structural changes. However, a conventional model in which economic growth trends
and business cycles are independent of each other is unable to capture the structural com-
ponents of labor fluctuations over business cycles.
In this study, I build a model of unbalanced growth that allows for interactions between
labor market trends and business cycles. I use the model to formally assess the role of IT
growth, which takes the form of Routine-Biased Technological Change (RBTC), in driv-
ing the decline of routine labor income share and employment relative to nonroutine labor,
the decline of the overall labor income share relative to capital, and the rise of jobless
recoveries. The model builds upon the general equilibrium framework in Krusell, Oha-
3
nian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000) and incorporates the task model of Autor, Levy, and
Murnane (2003). The key assumption is familiar and intuitive: that “IT capital” is highly
substitutable for routine labor and highly complementary to nonroutine labor. As a result,
progress in IT, or “the rise of the machines”, leads to a permanent decline in the demand
for routine labor and a permanent rise in the demand for nonroutine labor.
The model yields several interesting results. First, I show analytically that the overall
labor income share follows a U-shaped growth path under RBTC, as opposed to a contin-
ued decline as suggested by previous studies (Morin, 2014 and Karabarbounis and Neiman,
2014) and feared by the public. This U-shaped path arises as the monotonic decline of the
routine labor share is increasingly offset by the monotonic rise of the nonroutine labor
share over time. More specifically, if routine labor initially constitutes a large share in
employment and labor income, as is the case of the United States in the 1980s, then the
substitutability between IT capital and routine labor dominates the complementarity be-
tween IT capital and nonroutine labor, and overall labor is effectively a net substitute for
capital in the aggregate production function. At this stage, capital-augmenting technolog-
ical change, such as IT progress, causes the overall labor’s share of total income to fall.
Over time, however, RBTC induces labor to flow away from the routine sector towards the
nonroutine sector; as a result, overall labor and capital become increasingly complemen-
tary. After reaching an inflection point, overall labor becomes effectively a net complement
for capital, and IT progress causes the labor share to rise relative to capital. In other words,
RBTC implies a declining elasticity of substitution (EOS) between overall labor and cap-
ital. This result contributes to the ongoing debate on capital-labor substitutability (see
Chirinko (2008) for a survey, also Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) for a more recent dis-
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cussion), as it is the first to highlight how changing composition of labor can significantly
alter the relation between overall labor and capital. The declining path for the capital-labor
EOS suggested by the model also provides a possible reconciliation between the recent
decline of labor share and the long-run complementarity between labor and capital. More-
over, the model’s prediction of a U-shaped path for the overall labor share suggests that
the recent decline is only temporary; in the long run, computerization and IT progress will
enhance labor’s share in total income rather than depressing it.
Second, to quantify these distributional effects on RBTC, I calibrate the model to U.S.
quarterly data in the period 1986-2014. Since the model features unbalanced growth paths
and is therefore nonstationary, I solve it using the Extended Function Path method (Maliar,
Maliar, Taylor, and Tsener, 2015). I find that, while RBTC drives large shifts in the em-
ployment and income distributions between routine and nonroutine labor, it has a relatively
mild effect on the income distribution between overall labor and capital. More specifically,
the calibrated model can account for nearly all of the divergence between routine and non-
routine labor in employment and income shares over time. This result suggests that, on the
aggregate level, RBTC is the driving force behind the decline of routine occupations rela-
tive to nonroutine occupations.1 The calibrated model can also account for the mild decline
of the overall labor share in the period 1986-2002, but cannot explain the acceleration of
the decline after 2002, which is consistent with the timing of events: computerization and
the IT revolution were major phenomena in the 1980s and 1990s, but the productivity gains
from technological progress slowed down notably in the middle 2000s (Fernald, 2014).
1Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2015) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) find the same result using
data from local markets and across countries, respectively.
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In total, my model generates a 2.3 percentage point decline of the labor income share in
the period 1986-2014, which is in line with the estimates of Eden and Gaggl (2014) and
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014).
Lastly, the model generates several novel results on the interactions between trends and
business cycles in the labor market. In particular, I show that when there are nonconvex
routine labor adjustment costs, the declining trend of routine labor hours takes a stepwise
shape with long periods of no decline and periods of large adjustments. This stepwise de-
cline of routine hours also induces infrequent but large fluctuations in overall labor hours,
which is qualitatively consistent with the patterns observed in the data. More importantly,
the model demonstrates how aggregate productivity shocks can significantly affect the tim-
ing of such trend adjustments. In particular, after a long period of inaction, the economy
enters a period in which the likelihood of downward trend adjustment is high. In this pe-
riod, even a small negative aggregate productivity shock can trigger a large downturn in the
labor market. The model identifies three such periods with heightened propensity to adjust
in the past 30 years, which retrospectively coincide well with the periods of downturns in
the labor market in the data. Lastly, the model suggests that the small drop of output at
the beginning of 2000, which was not enough to cause a recession, triggered one of largest
and prolonged labor market adjustments in recent years. This line of analysis complements
Jaimovich and Siu (2012), who focus on how secular trends can generate jobless recov-
eries, whereas in this study, I focus on how business cycles can affect the timing and the
magnitude of trend adjustments.
In addition to the main results stated above, in deriving the production structure of the
routine sector, I show that the commonly used Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
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function can be derived from a production technology that allows direct substitution be-
tween IT capital and routine labor in producing a continuous array of routine tasks. This
result provides a micro-foundation for the CES production function. Moreover, in an ex-
tension of the baseline model, I introduce a second type of technological change, which
I call Labor-Saving Technological Change (LSTC). LSTC augments non-IT capital and
substitutes for both types of labor, and therefore can be loosely associated with the rise of
globalization and offshoring. I show that the recent movements of factor shares, namely
the acceleration of the decline in the share of overall labor and the slowdown of the rise in
nonroutine labor’s share of aggregate income after 2002, are qualitatively consistent with a
second trend induced by LSTC. Quantitatively, however, the results are inconclusive.
This study is related and contributes to several large strands of literature on technolog-
ical changes and labor market trends and cycles. First, it builds upon the task model of
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), and is related to the
subsequent empirical literature on the polarization of the U.S. labor market (Autor, Katz,
and Kearney, 2006; Cortes, Jaimovich, Nekarda, and Siu, 2014; Lehn, 2015; and others). It
is also related to studies on the recent decline of the labor income share (Bridgman, 2014;
Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin, 2013; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Rognlie, 2015). Sec-
ond, this study contributes to a large literature on technological progress and unbalanced
growth (Gordon, 2010; Fernald, 2014; Acemoglu, 2002; Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008;
and others). Third, the business cycle analysis builds upon a long line of literature on labor
adjustment costs (Caballero and Engel, 1993; Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger, 1997;
Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis, 2015; Cooper and Willis, 2009). It contributes to a bur-
geoning literature on the joint dynamics of business cycles and labor market trends (Foote
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and Ryan, 2015; Gaggl and Kaufmann, 2014; Jaimovich and Siu, 2012; Morin, 2014).
Finally, the analysis on LSTC is in line with the most recent empirical findings on the dif-
ferential roles of trade and technology in the labor market (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2015;
Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents empirical
evidence on recent structural changes and business cycle dynamics observed in the U.S.
labor market and discusses the related literature. Section 1.3 presents a simple model with
RBTC and shows how it can generate labor market structural changes, in particular a U-
shaped growth path for the overall labor share and a declining EOS between overall labor
and capital. Section 1.4 presents the full baseline model, calibrates it to U.S. quarterly data,
and presents quantitative results on the goodness of fit for medium-run trends and business
cycle dynamics. Section 1.5 extends the baseline model to incorporate labor adjustment
costs and shows how aggregate productivity shocks may shift the timing and the magni-
tudes of the trend adjustments and cause them to concentrate in recessions. Section 1.6
extends the baseline model to incorporate LSTC in order to account for the acceleration of
the decline of labor’s share after 2002. Section 1.7 offers some concluding remarks.
1.2 Empirical Evidence and Related Literature
1.2.1 Divergence of Routine and Nonroutine Labor
The terms “routine” and “nonroutine” refer to the task content of an occupation. Con-
ceptually, a task is routine if it can be performed by following an explicit set of rules and
procedures. A task is nonroutine if it requires either abstract reasoning and creativity, or
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physical dexterity and direct interpersonal interaction. Generally speaking, routine tasks
are inherently more suitable for automation, while nonroutine tasks must be performed by
humans. It is worth noting that recent progress in machine learning and artificial intel-
ligence has made it increasingly difficult to draw a line between routine and nonroutine
tasks. Many tasks that were considered nonroutine only a few years ago, such as driving,
writing, and playing chess, can now be performed by machines or computers, albeit to a
limited extent. However, automation of such tasks relies heavily on the availability of big
data and/or a highly controlled environment. In any case, computers, machines and robots
cannot think or react in an uncontrolled environment like humans. Therefore, it is unlikely
that the majority of the nonroutine tasks and occupations defined in this study will become
routine in any foreseeable future.
I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG)
files available from 1979 onward as the main data source for employment, wages, hours,
and occupations. I also use the task data from Autor and Dorn (2013) and the harmonized
occupation classification system (occ1990dd) introduced by Dorn (2009) to pool occupa-
tions across different decades. I extend Dorn (2009)’s system by incorporating the most
recent revisions of the Census occupation codes after 2010.
In the literature, there have been two ad-hoc approaches to matching task data to occu-
pations. One approach, which was introduced by Autor and Dorn (2013) and used by Goos,
Manning, and Salomons (2014) and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2015), utilizes an index of
Routine Task Intensity (RTI), defined as:
RTIk = ln(T
R






k,1980 are measures (on a 0-10 scale) of routine, abstract, and
manual task inputs of occupation k in 1980.2 RTI measures the relative importance of
routine tasks in occupations, which can also be interpreted as an occupation’s potential
susceptibility to displacement by automation. In their analysis of the local labor markets,
Autor and Dorn (2013) label the occupations in the top 33% of the 1980-employment-
weighed distribution of RTI as routine occupations.
A second approach to defining routine and nonroutine occupations is by labeling major
occupation groups as one of four kinds: nonroutine-cognitive, routine-cognitive, routine-
manual, and nonroutine-manual. This is the approach taken by Jaimovich and Siu (2012)
and Foote and Ryan (2015), both of which study empirically the link between aggregate
labor market trends and business cycles. Table 1.1 shows the classification of six major
occupation groups into the four theory-based categories.3 Using this approach, about 60%
of occupations in 1980 are defined as routine, which is obviously much higher than the
measure based on the RTI approach used by Autor and Dorn (2013). The discrepancy
reflects the ad-hoc nature of both approaches: on the one hand, the RTI measure has a
2The RTI measure is based on Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and the task data from the 1997 Dic-
tionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), which assesses the occupational tasks of more than 12,000 highly
detailed occupations. Autor and Dorn (2013) aggregate the detailed occupations to the three-digit occupation
codes of the 1970 Census, and then map them to the harmonized occ1990dd occupation codes. There are
five original DOT task variables. The Routine task measure, TRk , is an average of two DOT variables, “set
limits, tolerances and standards” and “finger dexterity”, which measure the intensity of routine cognitive and
routine motor tasks in occupations. The Abstract task measure, TAk , is the average of “direction, control,
and planning” and “quantitative reasoning”. Lastly, the Manual task measure, TMk , corresponds to the DOT
variable “eye-hand-foot coordination”. Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) map the RTI measure to the
European occupational classification and study job polarization in 16 Western European countries.
3Classifying tasks along two dimensions, routine versus nonroutine and cognitive versus manual, is, again,
based on Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). The definition of major occupation groups varies across stud-
ies and over time. The decennial Census contains the official grouping, but the number and definition of
the groups change from one Census to another. The six occupation groups considered in this study is a
slightly aggregated and modified version of the Census groups and is discussed in Autor and Dorn (2013).
Nevertheless, no matter what the definitions of the major occupation groups are, the mapping of the under-
lying occupations into the four theory-based categories is very stable. See Foote and Ryan (2015) for more
discussion.
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straightforward and appealing interpretation on the occupation level, but the cut-off value
used to define routine and nonroutine — 33% in Autor and Dorn (2013) — is arbitrary. On
the other hand, labeling an entire occupation group as routine or nonroutine may overlook
significant variations across occupations within the group. For example, both being ser-
vice jobs, motion picture projectionists have an RTI of 6.22, the second highest among all
occupations, while recreation workers have an RTI of -1.89, one of the lowest.
Table 1.1
Classification of Major Occupation Groups
Major Occupation Groups
Nonroutine Cognitive Management, professional, technical, financial sales, public security
Routine Cognitive Administrative support and retail sales
Routine Manual Precision production and craft;
Machine operators assemblers, and inspectors;
Transportation, construction, mechanics, mining, agricultural
Nonroutine Manual Service
In light of these discrepancies, I use a classification scheme that combines the two
approaches in the existing literature to define routine and nonroutine occupations in this
study. I first rank occupations by their RTI values and divide the employment-weighed
distribution of RTI into three parts.4 I consider the top 1/3 occupations in the employment-
weighed RTI distribution as routine and the bottom 1/3 as nonroutine. For the middling
1/3, I consider an occupation routine if it belongs to one of the routine occupation groups
4The original Autor and Dorn (2013) classification uses employment in 1980 to weight the RTI distribu-
tion, but here I use the 1986 employment instead. The choice is made for two reasons. First, 1986 is the
starting year of my quantitative model to which several important parameters are calibrated. Second and
more importantly, under Dorn (2009)’s occupation categorization system, 68 occupations - about 1/5 of the
total - are missing in the 1980 data, while only 8 occupations are missing in the 1986 data. Nonetheless, none
of the results in this study are sensitive to using employment data in 1980 to measure routineness.
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listed in Table 1.1. Under this classification scheme, about 55% of occupations in 1980 are
defined as routine.
Figure 1.1
Divergence of Routine and Nonroutine Occupations
Figure 1.1 shows the divergence between routine and nonroutine occupations in terms
of labor hours and income shares in the period 1985-2014. Both panels display the shares
of routine and nonroutine labor within total labor input and income so that the vertical
levels in each figure sum up to 1. The share of routine labor in total hours has fallen from
53 percent in 1985 to 42 percent in 2014; the share of routine income in total labor income
has fallen from 47 percent to 36 percent over the same period. The decline is concentrated
in the manufacturing sector, but is also widespread in retail and wholesale trade.
1.2.2 Decline of Labor Income Share
Despite its central role in macroeconomic models and policy-making, the labor share
of income is difficult to measure. As a result, there has been considerable debate over
whether there has been a decline of the labor share in the United States.5. The main is-
5Some of the debate focuses on the difference between the gross labor share and the net labor share. In
this study, I focus on the gross labor income share as it matters for the aggregate production function and the
long-run factor share stability. The net labor share, which excludes capital depreciation and taxes from total
income, has shown little to no decline over time. The net income share matters for income inequality, which
is beyond the scope of this study. See Rognlie (2015) and Bridgman (2014) for empirical comparisons of
gross and net income shares.
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sue surrounding the measurement of aggregate labor share is that the division of labor and
capital income earned by the self-employed is inherently unclear, and therefore has to be
imputed (Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin, 2013; Gollin, 2002). The most commonly cited head-
line measure compiled by BLS suggests that the labor income share in the nonfarm business
sector has declined from 64 percent in the 1980s to 58 percent in 2012-14. However, Elsby,
Hobijn, and Şahin (2013) estimate that about a third of the decline of the BLS headline
measure is a statistical artifact due to the underlying assumptions made to impute labor’s
share of proprietors’ income. To be more specific, the BLS headline measure assumes that
the self-employed earn the same wage as payroll employees in the same industry. Elsby,
Hobijn, and Şahin (2013) show that this assumption implies a negative capital share in
proprietors’ income in the 1980s, suggesting that both the initial level and the subsequent
decline of labor share in the headline measure have been overstated. To circumvent the
measurement issue, several recent papers have focused on the payroll share in the corpo-
rate sector instead of the aggregate labor share. Using this strategy and both aggregate and
industry-level data, Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2013) conclude that the U.S. labor share of
income declined by around 4 percent between the early 1980s and the early 2010s. Using
cross-country data, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) document a global decline of labor
share of a similar magnitude. In addition, both studies find that the majority of the decline
is attributable to within-industry changes rather than to changes in industrial composition.
I construct my labor income share series for the private business sector using data from
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). I follow Fernald (2014) and assume
that the labor share in proprietors’ income is the same as that in the non-financial corpo-
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Figure 1.2
Decline of Labor Income Share
rate sector.6 Figures 1.2 displays the constructed series, as well as alternative measures
for different sectors, for the period 1960-2014. As these measures show, the labor share
experienced at most a mild downward trend between the 1980s and early 2000s, with sub-
stantial fluctuations. After 2002, the decline accelerated and the drop was steep. Overall,
my preferred measure yields a 6 percent drop of the average labor share between the 1980s
and 2010s.
It is well understood that in order to generate non-constant factor shares in the long
run, two conditions must be met in the aggregate production function. First, the elastic-
ity of substitution between capital and labor must not be 1, i.e., the aggregate production
function must not be Cobb-Douglas. Otherwise, changes in factor prices in the long run
will exactly offset changes in quantities, forcing constant income shares of effective cap-
ital and labor. In other words, any form of capital- or labor-augmenting technological
6The total cost equals revenue net of taxes on production and imports (TOPI), plus subsidies, plus the
portion of TOPI that is properly allocated to capital (i.e. property and motor vehicle taxes).
14
change is effectively Hicks-neutral under the Cobb-Douglas production function. Second,
the net technological change in the economy needs to be capital-augmenting. This condi-
tion stems from the simple yet fundamental asymmetry between capital and labor: capital
can accumulate indefinitely, at least in theory, but per capita labor input is bounded above.
When the production function is not Cobb-Douglas but the net technological change is
labor-augmenting, capital accumulation (i.e., deepening) allows capital income to grow at
the same pace as labor income, and thus keeps the relative factor income shares constant
along a balanced growth path. The same mechanism does not exist for labor when the net
technological change is capital-augmenting; as a result, factor shares can vary in the long
run.
Moreover, whether a capital-augmenting technological change is capital-biased or labor-
biased depends on the elasticity of substitution. When capital and labor are substitutes,
capital-augmenting technological change raises the income share of capital; when capi-
tal and labor are complements, capital-augmenting technological change raises the income
share of labor.
A production function with a non-unity Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and
capital-augmenting technological change is therefore the simplest structure for modeling
changing labor shares. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) estimate such a production func-
tion using cross-country data on the corporate sector and find that the elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and labor is around 1.25. They further argue that a declining price of
investment goods relative to consumption goods, which is in turn driven by computeriza-
tion and IT growth, explains roughly half of the overall decline in labor’s share since 1975.
They argue against other mechanisms including increasing markups and the changing skill
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Figure 1.3
Routine and Nonroutine Labor Share in Total Income
composition of the labor force.
Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin (2013), however, point out that the explanation for declining
labor share based on capital-labor substitutability in an aggregate production function is
incomplete because it is empirically inconsistent with the timing of events. Namely, the
largest decline of labor share took place in the 2000s, whereas IT-driven technological
progress peaked in the 1990s and possibly slowed down in the mid-2000s (see also Fernald
2014). They instead argue that globalization is more likely to be the driving force behind
the recent sharp decline of labor share since the 2000s. I address this issue in Section 1.6.
Figure 1.3 applies the division of labor income between routine and nonroutine workers
as in Figure 1.1b to the overall labor income share in Figure 1.2 to show the routine and
nonroutine labor shares in total income. This simple decomposition reveals two important
facts. First, the mild decline of the aggregate labor share is due to offsetting effects of
the decline of the routine share and the rise of the nonroutine share. Second, the marked
decline of the aggregate labor share after 2002 is driven primarily by a slowdown of the
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rise of the nonroutine share, and not by an accelerated decline of the routine share. This is
consistent with the findings of Beaudry, Green, and Sand (2013), who document a decline
in the demand for high-skilled workers since the early 2000s.
Figure 1.4
IT and Non-IT Capital Share in Total Income
Figure 1.4 shows the decomposition of capital income over the same time period. IT
capital can be narrowly defined as information processing equipment and software, or
broadly defined as equipment and software. Non-IT capital includes nonresidential struc-
tures. This figure reveals that the mild decline of the labor income share is driven by the
rise of IT capital share prior to the 2000s, but the sharp decline of labor share after the
2000s was driven by the increase of income accrued to structures. Moreover, panel (a)
shows that the crowd-out of IT-capital income by non-IT capital started around 2002, and
panel (b) shows that the share of IT-capital income within total income started to decline
around 2005. This is consistent with Fernald (2014), who documents a slowdown of IT
productivity growth prior to the onset of Great Recession.
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1.2.3 Labor Hours: Trend vs. Business Cycles
Figure 1.5 shows the total and average hours of routine, nonroutine, and overall labor
for the period of 1985-2014. Data on overall labor hours is for the U.S. nonfarm business
sector as published by the BLS Productivities and Costs release. Average labor hours is
defined as total hours divided by the trend labor force.7 This measure removes the effect of
population growth and most demographic changes on the evolution of labor inputs. Since in
this study I focus on structural changes due to demand-side channels and economic growth
due to technological changes, I use average labor hours as the main measure for labor input.
All series in Figure 1.5 are normalized to 100 in 1986Q1 to allow direct comparisons of
their paths.
Figure 1.5
Labor Hours over Business Cycles (1986=100)
Visual inspection yields several observations. First, after controlling for population
growth and demographic changes, average routine labor hours display a clear and signifi-
cant downward trend throughout the period, while average nonroutine hours grow strongly
before the 2000s but flatten afterwards. This pattern of divergence between routine and
7I use the trend labor force measure constructed by Aaronson, Cajner, Fallick, Galbis-Reig, Smith, and
Wascher (2014).
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nonroutine hours echoes the divergence of their respective income shares discussed in the
previous section. Second, the decline of average routine hours is not a gradual process;
instead, it has followed a roughly stepwise path since the mid 1980s and was largely con-
centrated in the short periods surrounding the three recessions. Third, all three series of
average hours are procyclical. Note that the procyclicality of average nonroutine hours
does not contradict the absence of decline in the total nonroutine hours during recessions
documented by Jaimovich and Siu (2012). Instead, it shows that the absence of decline in
the total nonroutine labor hours is largely driven by population growth. Fourth, routine and
overall labor hours display significant delays in recovery after the end of each recession,
causing the so-called “jobless recoveries.” Nonroutine hours, however, show no such delay
in recovery.
1.3 A Simple Model of Unbalanced Growth
In this section, I construct a simple model of unbalanced growth to study analytically
the key mechanism through which RBTC drives structural changes in the labor market. The
simple model has two sectors, a “routine” sector and a “nonroutine” sector. I first derive
the production function of the routine sector with direct substitution between IT capital and
routine labor at producing a continuous array of tasks. I show that the commonly used CES
production structure is a special case of this general form of technology. I complete the
final goods production function by introducing complementarity between IT capital and
nonroutine labor. I then conduct comparative statics analysis to show how IT growth drives
divergence between routine and nonroutine labor hours and income shares, as well as a
U-shaped growth path of the overall labor income share.
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1.3.1 Routine Task Production
First, I describe the routine sector and the routine-labor-replacing aspect of RBTC in de-
tail. The setup follows Acemoglu (2010) and Hawkins, Michaels, and Oh (2013). Through-
out the paper, I use “machines”, “computers”, and “IT capital” interchangeably.










where φ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between tasks. Any task can be performed by
either a machine or routine labor:
y(i) =

m(i)/κ(i) if task i is performed by machine
lr(i)/ι(i) if task i is performed by routine labor
Here m(i) and lr(i) denote the quantities of computer capital and routine labor used in
completing task i. One unit of y(i) is produced with either κ(i) units of machinery or ι(i)
units of routine labor. I assume that the array of tasks i ∈ [0, 1] are ordered based on the
relative productivity of machines and labor in completing them. Without loss of generality,
I assume that tasks at which machines are relatively productive are ordered first. That is,
i = 0 is the most machine-productive task and i = 1 is the most labor-productive. I assume,







strictly decreasing in i. The monotonicity of Φ(i) and the uniform distribution of i indicate
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a single crossing and the existence of a critical task i = θm, such that:
y(i) =

m(i)/κ(i) if i < θm
lr(i)/ι(i) if i > θm
At i = θm, the firm is indifferent between using machines or labor. Competitive factor
markets guarantee that the marginal cost of y(i) must be the same regardless of the means








where wr is the wage for routine labor and Rm is the rental rate for machines, taken as
given by the firm. Everything else equal, the higher the θm, the larger the machines’ share
in the production of the routine sector. If the productivity of machines grows relative to
that of routine labor over time, then in equilibrium more and more tasks will be carried out
by machines.
Within the routine sector, the firm’s optimization problem can be solved in two steps.
First, given the total quantity of computer capital M and routine labor Lr, the firm chooses
which tasks to perform with machines and which to perform with labor, and decides the
quantities of each factor to allocate to their respective tasks. This is a static problem that
yields a revenue function of the firm in terms of M and Lr. The second step is to choose
M and Lr in each period to maximize profits in a dynamic setting.
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To understand these terms, recall that 1/κ(i) is output per unit of capital in task i and φ > 1.
A(θ) is thus an aggregate over the average product of machines for the tasks they perform,
and may be interpreted as an index of machine productivity. The same idea applies to
B(θm) and labor productivity.

















We can also verify that the production function satisfies constant returns to scale.
The relative productivity of machines grows exogenously due to IT progress. I assume
that for any task i,
Φt(i) = Xm,tΦ̄(i) (1.7)
where Φ̄(i) is a time-invariant component of the relative productivity andXm,t is the growth
in IT. Implicit in this assumption is that IT is a “general purpose technology” (GPT), as
growing computing power raises the productivity of all computer capital relative to routine
labor.8
Special Case: CES between M and Lr
The task model described above gives us the micro-foundation of the aggregate produc-
tion function of the routine sector. It also gives us an interpretation of the key variable θm as
the critical task. However, due to the presence ofA(θm) andB(θm), the general form of the
production function (1.4) is technically difficult to work with. Here I show that CES can be
embedded with certain specifications of Φ̄(i). Incorporating the growth trend in computer




for task i, while the productivity of routine labor satisfies ι(i, t) = ι(i) = α−1r (1 − i)
1−ε
ε ,
with 0 < ε < 1 to ensure that machines and routine labor are substitutes. The relative
8It is also common in the literature to model the technological growth as an exogenous decline of the price
of IT capital (see Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Morin (2014), and Lehn (2015) for examples). With
perfect competition, it can be shown that these models are isomorphic to my model and yield essentially the
same evolution and dynamics of key variables.
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∈ (0,∞) for i ∈ (0, 1) (1.8)
It turns out that under this specification, the optimized production function of Y ∗r in (1.4)
collapses into the CES form (after scaling by a constant term):
Y ∗r = [λm (Xm,tM)













ε + (1− λm)Lεr
(1.10)
This CES version of the production function has been the most commonly used specifica-
tion in the literature (See Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Autor and Dorn (2013), and
Morin (2014) for examples).
It is worth noting that under this special structure of Φ(i), the optimized production
function for the routine sector no longer depends on the elasticity of substitution between
tasks, φ; instead, it depends on the elasticity of substitution between computer capital and
routine labor, which is assumed to be constant.
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1.3.2 Final Goods Production
A unique final good is produced competitively by combining inputs produced by the





n,t + (1− λn)Y σr,t
] 1
σ (1.11)




ε + (1− λm)Lεr,t
] 1
ε (1.13)
where Ln,t is nonroutine labor input and λn is a scaling parameter. The key assumptions
about the production structure are: (1) the elasticity of substitution between Mt and Lr,t is
1
1−ε > 1, and (2) the elasticity of substitution between Ln,t and Yr,t is
1
1−σ < 1. That is, IT
capital is a net substitute for routine labor and a net complement for nonroutine labor.





where Ct is consumption at time t and β is the time discount factor. For simplicity, labor,
Lt, is supplied inelastically and there is no population growth or other form of technological
change besides Xm,t. Labor market clearing requires:
Ln,t + Lr,t = Lt ≡ 1 (1.15)
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and the resource constraint is given by:
Yt ≥ Ct +Mt+1 − (1− δm)Mt (1.16)
where δm is the depreciation rate of IT capital.
Competitive Equilibrium
I denote the prices of the Yn,t and Yr,t goods as pn,t and pr,t. I normalize the price of the
final good, Pt, to 1 at all times so that

















Since labor is supplied inelastically, routine and nonroutine labor receive the same
wage, wt. A competitive equilibrium is defined in the usual way as paths for factor and in-
termediate goods prices [wt, Rm,t, pn,t, pr,t]t≥0, labor and capital allocations [Ln,t, Lr,t,Mt]t≥0,
and consumption and savings decision [Ct,Mt+1]t≥0 such that firms maximize profits,
households maximize utility, and markets clear.
Since markets are complete and competitive, we can appeal to the second welfare the-
orem and characterize the competitive equilibrium by solving the social planner’s problem
of maximizing the utility of the representative household subject to exogenous technolog-
ical progress Xm,t, labor market clearing condition (1.15), and resource constraint (1.16),
together with the initial condition that all real variables start with positive values. The ob-
jective function in this program is continuous and strictly concave, and the constraint set
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forms a convex-valued continuous correspondence. Thus the social planner’s problem has
a unique solution, which corresponds to the unique competitive equilibrium.
There are two steps to deriving the social planner’s solution. First, given the capital
and total labor level in each period, Mt and Lt, there is a static optimal division of Lr,t and
Ln,t that maximizes Yt so as to achieve the largest possible set of allocations that satisfy the
constraint set. The second step is the dynamic choices of Mt+1 and Ct, which depend on
the intertemporal rate of substitution.
The optimal division of Lr,t and Ln,t is given by equalizing their marginal products,























It is useful to define Θn,t and Θm,t as the share of nonroutine labor in total income and the





λnLσn,t + (1− λn)Y σr,t




λm(Xm,tMt)ε + (1− λm)Lεr,t
∈ (0, 1) (1.20)
We can compute the overall income share of labor in the economy as
sL,t = Θn,t + (1−Θn,t)(1−Θm,t) (1.21)
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with the income shares of nonroutine labor and routine labor each given by
sLn,t = Θn,t (1.22)
sLr,t = (1−Θn,t)(1−Θm,t) (1.23)
The income share of capital is therefore
sM,t = (1−Θn,t)Θm,t (1.24)












The left side of equation (1.26) is the ratio of hours of nonroutine and routine labor; the
right side is the ratio of income. Equation (1.26) shows that the optimal division of Lr,t
and Ln,t occurs when these two ratios are equalized. This result depends on several simpli-
fying assumptions, including complete and competitive markets and inelastic labor supply.
Introducing wedges on the labor supply side can lead to departures from (1.26), includ-
ing preference of one type of labor over another and frictions in labor adjustments. While
equation (1.26) helps simplify the analysis, the results discussed below do not hinge on this
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exact equation.
1.3.3 Labor Market Structural Changes
In this section, I derive several analytical results regarding the growth path of the routine
and nonroutine shares in hours and income, as well as the income shares of overall labor
and IT capital.






















for σ < 0 and 0 < ε < 1.
Proof. Using Ln,t = ηtLt and Lr,t = (1− ηt)Lt, equation (1.18) can be rewritten as
ηt
(1− ηt)





















































































































































ε−σ > 1 and
1
Θm
> 1, for σ < 0, 0 < ε < 1, and 0 < Θm,t < 1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1.3.1 states that the IT capital-augmenting technological progress Xm,t in-
duces labor inputs (hours) to flow from the routine sector to the nonroutine sector. The
direction of the flow results directly from the assumed range of parameters, σ and ε, which
govern the relative elasticities of substitution between IT capital and the two types of labor.
In addition, the model predicts that in the long run, continued RBTC will eventually render
routine labor obsolete, as all routine tasks will be performed by computers and machines,
while all human labor inputs will be nonroutine in nature.
The next set of theorems consider the impact of IT progress on income shares:
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for σ < 0 and 0 < ε < 1.
Proof. First I show that d ln(Θn,t)
d ln(Xm,t)
> 0. Using the definition of Θn,t in equation (1.19) and




































To show d ln(Θn,t)
d ln(Xm,t)
> 0 it suffices to show
d ln(ηt)
d ln(Xm,t)
−Θm,t(1−Θn,t) < 0 (1.32)



































































> 0, as 0 < ε < 1, σ < 0

























which proves the first half of Lemma 1.3.1.
I now show that d ln(Θm,t)
d ln(Xm,t)
> 0. Again, using the definition of Θm,t in equation (1.19)

























using the result from Proposition 1.3.1 that d ln(ηt)
d ln(Xm,t)




Lemma 1.3.1 states that IT progress raises the income share of nonroutine labor and
the income share of IT capital within the routine sector. Using this result, we can prove the
following:
















for σ < 0 and 0 < ε < 1.
Proof. Follows directly the definition of routine and nonroutine labor income shares in
equation (1.22) and the result from Lemma 1.3.1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1.3.2 states that monotonic growth in IT productivity Xm,t drives a mono-
tonic decline in the routine labor share in total income. Since both types of labor receive
the same wage in equilibrium, Proposition 1.3.1 already implies that the income of non-
routine labor would rise relative to routine labor due to growth in Xm,t. What Proposition
1.3.2 shows is that the routine labor share of total income also falls. Again, this is due to
the complementarity (substitutability) of nonroutine (routine) labor and IT capital in the
production function.







−σ(1− ε)Θn,tΘm,t − ε(1− σ)(1−Θm,t)


























for σ < 0 and 0 < ε < 1.
Proof. Using the definition of the total labor income share in equation (1.21) and the results
















−σ(1− ε)Θn,tΘm,t − ε(1− σ)(1−Θm,t)
(1− ε)Θn,tΘm,t + (1− σ)(1−Θm,t)
]
Note that Θm,t(1 − Θn,t) > 0 and [(1− ε)Θn,tΘm,t + (1− σ)(1−Θm,t)] > 0 for any
concave production function, and the sign of d ln(sL,t)
d ln(Xm,t)
depends on the sign of the numerator
inside the bracket on the right side. Since both Θn,t and Θm,t are continuous, monotonically
increasing functions in time (by Lemma 1.3.1) and have a range of (0, 1), Θn,tΘm,t
(1−Θm,t) ∈ (0,∞)
is also a monotonically increasing function in time. Continuity and monotonicity in the
range of (0,∞) imply a single crossing of Θn,tΘm,t
(1−Θm,t) at
ε(1−σ)




Proposition 1.3.3 is one of the most important results of this study. It states that if the
economy starts in a state in which routine labor has a sufficiently large share in production
and total income, i.e., sLn,tsM,t
sLr,t
< ε(1−σ)
σ(ε−1) , as is the case of the U.S. economy in the 1980s,
then the total labor income share will first fall and then rise again in response to ongoing
growth in IT productivity, following a U-shaped path. To understand this result, it is useful













d ln(XM,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1.37)
That is, the elasticity of the overall labor income share with respect to RBTC is the sum
of the elasticities of routine and nonroutine labor income shares with respect to RBTC,
weighted by their respective shares within overall labor income. Lemma 1.3.1 and Propo-
sition 1.3.2 have established that IT progress causes a monotonic decrease in the routine
income share and a monotonic increase in the nonroutine labor income share. If routine
labor initially accounts for a sufficiently large share of the economy, then its fall will first
outweigh the rise of nonroutine income, causing the total labor income share to fall. Over
time and as labor continues to flow from the routine sector to the nonroutine sector (Propo-
sition 1.3.1), there will be a turning point after which the rise of nonroutine labor will
outweigh the fall of routine labor, and the total labor income share will start to rise again.
In other words, the U-shaped path stems from the monotonic decline of the routine labor
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share being increasingly offset by the monotonic rise of the nonroutine labor share. This
result suggests that the recent observed decline of the labor income share will reverse in
the future. Moreover, if IT productivity continues to grow indefinitely, the total labor in-
come share will continue to rise and approach 1 in the long run. Proposition 1.3.3 also
naturally implies that the IT capital income share, sM,t = 1 − sL,t, will first rise and then
fall. Furthermore, Proposition 1.3.3 states that the timing of the turning point depends on
the relative magnitudes of the complementarity and the substitutability between IT capital
and the two types of labor.
Last but not least, the U-shaped path for the overall labor income share implies a de-
clining elasticity of substitution between overall labor and capital in this model:
Proposition 1.3.4 (Declining Capital-Labor EOS). The Elasticity of Substitution between
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for σ < 0 and 0 < ε < 1.
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Using the result from 1.3.3, we get the expression in 1.3.4. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1.3.4 provides an alternative perspective on the time-varying nature of the
relationship between overall labor and capital that is central to this model of unbalanced
growth. As the composition of labor shifts from routine-intensive to nonroutine-intensive
tasks over time, overall labor and capital become increasingly complementary. Given that
RBTC is capital-augmenting, the overall labor share declines initially when capital and
labor are net substitutes and rises later when capital and labor are net complements. The
economy reaches the inflection point when EOS(Mt, Lt) is exactly 1. In addition, the
substitutability between overall labor and capital is bounded between the substitutability
between capital and routine labor and the substitutability between capital and nonroutine
labor. As a result, the model yields a declining path for the elasticity of substitution between
the overall labor and capital as depicted in Figure 1.6.












There has been a wide range of estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor in the literature (see Chirinko 2008 for a survey). Most estimates of the EOS
between overall labor and capital have been less than 1, while a recent influential paper by
37
Figure 1.6
Declining Capital-Labor Elasticity of Substitution
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) documents a global decline of labor share and estimates
the EOS to be around 1.25. My results provide a possible reconciliation of these two
observations by emphasizing the time-varying nature of the EOS under RBTC.
1.3.4 Asymptotic State of Model Economy
The shifts of factor shares naturally imply that there is no Balanced Growth Path (BGP)
in the model for XM,t < ∞. The factor shares in the asymptotic state of the economy are
described as in Proposition 1.3.5:






















n,t + (1− λn)(XM,tMt)σ
] 1
σ , σ < 0
Proof. Both Lr,t and Ln,t are bounded above at 1. By Equation 1.19, lim
XM,t→∞
Θm,t = 1 and
lim
XM,t→∞
Θn,t = 1. The rest of the results follow by definitions. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1.3.5 states that in the long run, continued growth in RBTC will eventually
render routine labor obsolete, as all routine tasks will be performed by computers and
machines, while all human labor inputs will be nonroutine in nature. Moreover, because
nonroutine human inputs are a complement for the routine tasks performed by computers,
technology is labor-biased in nature and labor share of income will rise and eventually
approach one in the long run.
The long-run properties of the model economy presented in Proposition 1.3.5 are driven
by the exogenous nature of the technological progress in the simple model. In reality, how-
ever, the IT capital income share is unlikely to decline indefinitely, because technologies
are created by firms choosing to invest in R&D, and the endogenous production of tech-
nology will slow down eventually as the IT capital income share declines. We conjecture
that adding a “self-correcting” mechanism between endogenous technological progress and
capital income to the model would create another inflection point on the right side of the
U-shaped curve, after which the rise of the labor share would slow down and approach
a level less than one asymptotically. Understanding fully the feedback between techno-
logical change and the transitional dynamics would require an endogenous growth model
(see Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2015 for example), which is beyond the scope of this study.
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Figure 1.7
Simple Model Simulation: Time Paths of Key Structural Variables
In my quantitative exercise below, I take into account a potential eventual slowdown of
technology by fitting the data on recent IT progress to a logistic function with a long-run
limit.
1.3.5 Simple Model Simulation
To help readers visualize the analytical results presented above, I simulate the simple
model and show the dynamic time paths of the key structural variables (Figure 1.7) as well
as the capital-labor elasticity of substitution (Figure 1.6). In this exercise, I use reasonable
parameter values whenever possible, but set the initial factor shares to extreme values in
order to show the entire range of values for the model variables. In particular, I solve the
model using the following parameterization: β = 0.985, δm = 0.04, ε = 0.2, σ = −1.5,
λm = 0.1548, λn = 2.9292e − 08, and Xm,t = 1.03Xm,t−1 with Xm,0 = 1. Parameters
β, δm, ε and σ are set to the same values as in the full quantitative model discussed in detail
40
in the next section. Parameters λm and λn are calibrated so that the initial factor shares
are sM,0 = 0.2, sLr,0 = 0.799, and sLn,0 = 0.001. Under this parameterization, nearly all
labor in the model economy is routine initially. I simulate the model for 600 periods until
it approaches its asymptotic state, in which nearly all labor has become nonroutine and the
overall labor income share approaches 1.
1.4 Full Quantitative Model: Frictionless Baseline
In this section, I describe the full quantitative model, in which a few extra ingredients
are introduced in order to take the model to the data. First, I add a second type of capital,
“non-IT capital,” to the final goods production function, as it accounts for more than 20
percent of national income in the data. Second, I assume that the household labor supply
is elastic, which allows me to study fluctuations of overall labor hours. Third, I introduce
aggregate Total Factor Productivity (TFP) shocks to generate business cycles. I continue
to assume that markets are complete and competitive and thus I only describe the social
planner’s problem.
1.4.1 Setup
Final goods production takes four inputs: IT capital, M ; non-IT capital, K; routine
labor, Lr; and nonroutine labor, Ln. Production is also subject to an aggregate productivity
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By adding non-IT capital as a Cobb-Douglas term in the production function, all the
analytical results derived above continue to hold. It is easy to see that adding K does not
affect the mechanism through which RBTC drives the divergence between Lr and Ln. We
can further show that the U-shaped growth path for the overall labor income share is also
preserved if the elasticity of substitution between K and overall labor is always 1. Recall
that the labor income share follows a U-shaped path because the elasticity of substitution
between IT capital and overall labor falls over time, from more than 1 to less than 1. Since
the elasticity of substitution betweenK and labor is always equal to 1 under Cobb-Douglas,
the elasticity of substitution between overall capital - including bothM andK - and overall
labor in the full model follows a similar path, yielding a U-shaped path for the labor income
share in the long run.





where Xm,0 = 1. Under a logistic growth path, IT productivity grows approximately
exponentially at the initial stage. After reaching an inflection point at time τ , the growth
rate starts to decline and Xm,t eventually stabilizes and approaches X̄m asymptotically.
The TFP shock zt follows an AR(1) process:
log(zt) = ρz log(zt−1) + ut (1.43)
with 0 < ρz < 1 and ut ∼ N (0, σ2z). I abstract from TFP growth and other forms of
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technological change in the baseline model for the sake of a clean exposition of the effects
of RBTC.




βt {ln(Ct)− χ(Lr,t + ρLn,t)} (1.44)
where parameter χ governs the relative utility of consumption and leisure, and ρ governs
the relative disutility from supplying routine and nonroutine labor. The functional form
of the utility function has several important implications regarding equilibrium wages and
labor supply functions. First, the utility function assumes a constant ratio between disu-
tilities from supplying routine and nonroutine labor, which in turn implies a constant ratio
between routine and nonroutine wages in equilibrium in the baseline frictionless model.
This simplifying assumption is motivated by the relative constancy of relative wages in the
data (Figure 1.8).9 Second, assuming that in the long-run XM,t stabilizes, the utility func-
tion implies that the substitution effect of the permanent real wage growth on the supply
of labor bundle (Lr + ρLn) exactly offsets the income effect. As a result, (Lr + ρLn)
will stabilize in the long run. This means that if and only if ρ = 1, then the overall labor
L = (Lr + Ln) is stable along the transitional path. In the empirically relevant case that
ρ > 1, the overall labor L = (Lr+Ln) will be decreasing along the transition path and then
9The constancy of the relative wage between routine and nonroutine labor masks substantial movements
of the relative wage between the high-skilled nonroutine-cognitive workers and the middle-skilled routine
workers, as well as the relative wage between the routine workers and low-skilled nonroutine-manual workers,
in different sub-periods. Moreover, it is likely to be driven by the way topcoded income is treated in the CPS.
Following the labor literature, I multiplied topcoded income — mostly nonroutine — in the CPS by a factor
of 1.5. However, since the topcoding only changes infrequently, the procedure does not completely alleviate
the bias of topcoding over time.
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stabilize at a level permanently lower than its initial value as the long-run XM,t stabilizes.10
Lastly, note that this decline of long-run labor hours is not due to the linear nature of the
labor disutility in (1.44); instead, it results from the wedge between Ln and Lr and the
changing composition of L. In other words, using logarithm or power disutility functions
for labor in (1.44) will yield the same long-run results.
Figure 1.8
Relative Wages of Routine and Nonroutine Labor
Finally, the resource constraint of the economy is given by:
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where δm and δk are the depreciation rates of the two types of capital.
10To see this, suppose that the utility function (1.44) is maximized subject to a static budget constraint
wrLr + wnLn = C. The first order conditions with respect to the intra-temporal routine/nonroutine labor-
consumption choices are then given by wr = χC and wn = ρχC. Putting these three equations together,
we get Lr + ρLn = 1χ and ∆Lr = −ρ∆Ln. If and only if ρ = 1 does the increase in Ln exactly offset the
decrease in Lr. If ρ > 1 and ∆Lr < 0, then ∆L = ∆Lr + ∆Ln < 0.
44
1.4.2 Calibration
I calibrate the model to U.S. quarterly data in the period 1986-2014. I choose 1986 as
the starting point because the output gap was low at that time, so the economy could be
thought of as approaching steady state. The complete list of calibrated parameters is in
Table 1.2.
Table 1.2
Benchmark Calibration of Model with RBTC and Unbalanced Growth
Parameters Values Calibration Targets or Sources
β: Households’ discount factor 0.985 Average annual capital return = 4%
α: Non-IT capital income share 0.20 Average non-IT capital income share
δk: Non-IT capital depreciation 0.015 Average non-IT capital depreciation
δm: IT capital depreciation 0.045 Average IT capital depreciation
χ: Relative weight of labor disutility 2.273 Labor hours = 0.33 in 1986Q1
ρ: Relative disutility from Ln, Lr 1.251 NR/R wage ratio in 1986Q1
λm: Scaling parameter 0.223 Routine income share = 0.33 in 1986Q1
λn: Scaling parameter 0.254 Nonroutine income share = 0.34 in 1986Q1
ε: Substitution between M and Lr 0.20 EOS=1.25, Karabarbounis & Neiman (2014)
σ: Substitution between M and Ln -1.50 EOS=0.40, model fit of ηt from 1986-1990
µ: Growth rate of RBTC 0.014 Logistic function fitting of DiCecio (2009)
τ : Inflection point of RBTC 270 Logistic function fitting of DiCecio (2009)
X̄m: Asymptotic level of RBTC 29.48 Logistic function fitting of DiCecio (2009)
ρz: Persistence of TFP shocks 0.90 Estimation using output data, 1986-2014
σz: Variance of TFP shocks 0.045 Estimation using output data, 1986-2014
There are a total of 15 parameters in the baseline model, and I divide them into four
groups. The first group of parameters, including β, α, δk, and δm, are calibrated by match-
ing the average value of the associated targets over the entire 1986-2014 period. First, I set
the household discount factor β = 0.985 to match a long-run capital return of 4 percent per
year. Next, I calibrate the parameters related to the two types of capital. I use data from
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the detailed Fixed Assets Accounts and National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to construct empirical counterparts
of IT and non-IT capital. Since I focus on technological changes that increase the substi-
tutability of IT capital and routine labor, the main criterion I use in distinguishing M and
K in the data is whether a type of fixed asset performs tasks that can potentially be done by
labor. By this criterion, M should include not only high-tech capital such as information
processing equipment and software, but also various types of industrial equipment that have
been increasingly computerized and are central to automation. Therefore, in the baseline
calibration, I include both nonresidential equipment and software as M and nonresidential
structures as K.11 Under this categorization, the non-IT capital income share α = 0.2. The
average annual depreciation rate is approximately 18 percent for IT capital and 6 percent
for non-IT capital over the period 1986-2014. Thus, I calibrate the quarterly depreciation
rates δm = 0.045 and δk = 0.015.
The second group of parameters, including χ, λm, λn, and ρ are calibrated by matching
the value of the associated targets at the start of 1986. As the model is time-dependent,
this allows me to match the initial points of the time paths for labor hours and income
shares to the data and assess the model’s ability to match the subsequent growth paths. In
particular, I calibrate χ = 2.273 to set initial overall labor hours to L = 0.33.12 I set the two
scaling parameters λm = 0.223 and λn = 0.254 to match the initial shares of routine and
11All the results discussed below are robust to using narrower definitions of M .
12In theory, since the model is non-stationary and solved using backward induction, one cannot calibrate
parameter values to target objects in the first period without solving the entire time paths, which is very costly.
Therefore, in practice, I calibrate these parameters by constructing a pseudo “steady state,” shutting down
both RBTC growth and TFP shocks and computing the “steady state” of the economy as if in a stationary
environment in period 1. The bias from this approximation is negligible and has near zero impact on the
results.
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nonroutine labor in total income. I set parameter ρ = 1.25 to match the initial nonroutine
and routine wage ratio as shown in Figure 1.8.
The third group of parameters includes ε and σ, which govern the elasticities of substitu-
tion between IT capital and the two types of labor, and the three parameters that govern the
exogenous RBTC progress. These parameters are of central importance to the dynamics of
the model and have been discussed at the end of Section 1.3.3. When taking into consider-
ation the distinction between IT and non-IT capital (or between equipment and structures),
estimates of the elasticity between IT capital and labor are consistently between 1 and 2
(Tevlin and Whelan (2003), for example). In the baseline calibration, I set the EOS be-
tween IT capital and routine labor to 1
1−ε = 1.25, which is the estimate of Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2014) for the EOS between overall capital and labor and therefore serves as a
conservative value for the EOS between M and Lr.13 To calibrate the elasticity of substitu-
tion between M and Ln, I follow the strategy of Lehn (2015) and set it to match the growth
path of ηt between 1986 and 1990. I then assess the model’s ability to match labor market
structural shifts after 1990. The calibrated elasticity of substitution between M and Ln is
1
1−σ = 0.4. Both elasticities are well within range of the estimates in the literature.
I use the inverse of the relative price of equipment measured by DiCecio (2009) to
proxy for the exogenous Xm,t process. I fit the series to a logistic function as in (1.42)
and obtain values for parameters µ, τ and X̄m. The fitted logistic growth path is shown in
Figure 1.9a. I then extrapolate the series to 600 periods (1.9b) to study long-run projections
of the model.
13A high value in the literature is 1.67, estimated by Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000) as




The last group of parameters, ρz and σz, govern the AR(1) process of TFP shocks. To
set their values, I first solve the model and use the cyclical components of output from the
data to back out the zt series.14 This way, the cyclical components of output generated by
the model matches those in the data, which allow me to focus on the trend movements later.
I then use the extracted zt series and estimate that ρz = 0.9 and σz = 0.045.
1.4.3 Computation Method
Since the model does not have a balanced growth path and therefore cannot be “de-
trended” by Xm,t, I solve the model over a finite horizon with backward induction. The
algorithm is akin to the Extended Function Path method studied in Maliar, Maliar, Taylor,
and Tsener (2015). In period 0, agents learn that Xm,t will start growing and stop after T
periods. T is chosen to be large enough such that Xm,t would have approached its long-run
level. I first solve for the value function in the last period and then iterate backwards. The
solution to the model is the entire set of value functions and decision rules along the time
path. In addition, I adapt the Envelope Condition Method of Arellano, Maliar, Maliar, and
Tsyrennikov (2013) into the backward induction routine to solve the frictionless baseline
14The cyclical components of output are obtained by applying an HP filter with λhp = 1600.
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model. I use value function iteration to solve the model with nonconvex labor adjustment
cost. Lastly, I use the Smolyak Method of Judd, Maliar, Maliar, and Valero (2014) to deal
with the moderately high dimensions.
1.4.4 Results
I now present results from the frictionless baseline model and assess the model’s ability
to match the medium-run labor market trends in the data. I then discuss the model’s long
run predictions, extrapolating the IT growth process into the future.
Figure 1.10 describes the model’s quantitative performance at matching the observed
U.S. labor market trends in the period 1986-2014. First and foremost, the model does a
good job at matching the divergence between routine and nonroutine shares in labor hours
and labor income, which provides strong evidence that IT growth or RBTC is the main
driving force behind the divergence of labor market outcomes between the two groups of
workers.
Second, the model generates a mild decline of the overall labor income share, consistent
with the trend in the data observed from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s. It cannot,
however, account for the sharp decline of labor’s share observed after 2002. In addition,
because the income share of non-IT capital is assumed to be constant, the model generates a
corresponding, mildly increasing trend in the IT capital income share, which is qualitatively
consistent with the data. Note that the problem with labor share cannot be fixed by simply
allowing a non-constant share of non-IT capital in this model. If we assume (realistically)
that non-IT capital is a relative complement for IT capital and both types of labor, RBTC
would cause its income share to rise over time. However, in the data, the non-IT capital
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Figure 1.10
Model Performance: Medium-Run Structural Changes (1986-2014)
income share fell mildly from the mid-1980s through the early 2000s. After the early
2000s, it rose sharply, as the income share of structures soared during the housing boom.
See Rognlie (2015) for details on this issue.
Third, the model does a good job at matching the decline of the routine labor share of
total labor income and the corresponding rise of the nonroutine income share, in particular
before the early 2000s. The model does not capture the accelerated decline of the share of
routine labor in total income or the slowdown and mild fall of the nonroutine labor share
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of total income after the early 2000s. Together with the fact that RBTC explains most of
the divergence between routine and nonroutine labor throughout the sample period, one
can infer that another force is behind the accelerated fall of routine labor’s share and the
marked slowdown of nonroutine labor’s share after the early 2000s. Put differently, a model
with one smooth monotonic trend in technology cannot possibly match the time-varying
medium-run trends in factor shares observed in data.
Figure 1.11
Model Performance: Long-Run Projection of Labor Share
Figure 1.11 shows the long-run projections of overall labor shares under the extrap-
olated logistic growth path of RBTC depicted in Figure 1.9 (“baseline”) as well as two
alternative paths with higher Xm,t growth rates after 2015. Several observations can be
made. First, the U-shaped growth pattern is evident in all three series. Second, ceteris
paribus, the faster the growth rate of Xm,t, the sooner the inflection point in the labor share
path, and the higher the asymptotic level of Xm,t, the higher the asymptotic level of labor’s
share. In the baseline projection in which the Xm,t path is extrapolated from data, labor’s
share stops falling around 2030. The caveat is, of course, that the projection does not take
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into account the fact that labor’s share fell much more in the data than in the model during
the 2000s due to reasons that RBTC cannot explain.
Figure 1.12
Model Performance: Long-Run Projections of Output and Labor Hours
Lastly, Figure 1.12 shows the model’s long-run projections of output growth and la-
bor hours. Note that RBTC can only account for about 60% of output growth between
1986-2014 (as shown in Figure 1.13a). Thus, Figure 1.12(a) only depicts the portion of
output growth that is driven by exogenous IT progress, which is assumed to continue grow
logistically. The model also predicts that routine (nonroutine) labor hours decline (rise)
monotonically before the exogenous RBTC process slows down. More importantly, the
calibrated model predicts that overall labor hours, which is the sum of routine and non-
routine hours, declines in the long run. This is in contrast with the predicted evolution of
the overall labor income share, which follows a U-shaped path. The difference is that the
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income shares are completely pinned down by the production side if factors are paid their
marginal products, but the equilibrium levels of labor hours are determined by labor de-
mand and supply jointly. As discussed before, the utility function allows the income effect
of permanent wage growth on labor supply to outweigh substitution effect along transition
path, resulting in a permanently lower level of overall labor hours.
1.5 Interactions Between Trends and Cycles: The Role of Labor Adjustment Costs
In this section, I explore the interactions between the secular trend and business cycles.
Traditionally, economic growth and business cycles are often treated as separate subjects
and studied in different models. The underlying assumption is that factors that drive booms
and busts in economic activities are independent of the forces that drive long-run growth. I
show that this is not the case for IT progress. In the presence of short-run frictions, such as
nonconvex labor adjustment costs, the long-run decline (rise) of routine (nonroutine) labor
may give rise to endogenous fluctuations.
Figure 1.13 shows the time paths of output and labor hours generated by the frictionless
baseline model presented in the previous section. The TFP shocks used in the simulation
are backed out by matching the cyclical components of output to the data. The frictionless
baseline model does not generate interesting interactions between the secular trend and
business cycles. This is not surprising, as without frictions, output and labor hours fluctuate
around their respective long-run trends, with the cyclical components identical to those
from a model without exogenous RBTC growth (not shown here). Since the inevitable
trend adjustments are costless in the short run, they are instant. As a result, the frictionless
baseline model does not capture the observed stepwise pattern of the routine labor decline
53
Figure 1.13
Output and Labor Hours Over Business Cycles: Frictionless Baseline Model
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(Figure 1.13c), which is not surprising. In addition, the underlying trend components for
routine and nonroutine labor hours offset each other, so the frictionless model does not
generate the large swings of overall labor hours observed in the data (Figure 1.13b).
Short-run frictions are necessary to induce interesting interactions between the trend
and the cycle. To study frictions, I introduce a simple form of nonconvex labor adjustment
cost and assess its impact on the model’s performance. I assume that the adjustment cost
takes the form of Organizational Disruption as follows:
AC(Lr,t−1, Lr,t) =

0 if Lr,t = Lr,t−1
ωYt if Lr,t 6= Lr,t−1
(1.45)
That is, adjustment of routine labor disrupts the production process and incurs a loss of
output of ωYt.15 Organizational Disruption is a form of nonconvex adjustment cost, which
induces inaction regions in the labor hours decision rule. Moreover, since the size of the
adjustment cost depends on the output level, it is more costly to adjust labor during booms
than during recessions. Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2015) and Cooper and Willis
(2009) find that a model with disruption costs provides a better match of employment dy-
namics in plant-level data than a model containing fixed or quadratic adjustment costs.
The resource constraint of the economy is given by:
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15For simplicity, I have abstracted from other types of adjustment cost, including both nonroutine labor
adjustment cost and capital adjustment cost.
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To calibrate the parameter ω that governs the size of the nonconvex labor adjustment
cost, I refer to Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2015), who find that a model with a disrup-
tion cost of around 0.8 percent of output at the plant level can match the observed moments
in the aggregate employment and hours data. Since in this model I assume an adjustment
cost for routine labor only, I scale their estimate by the routine labor income share in 1986
and obtain ω = 0.00275.
Results
Figure 1.14 shows sample paths generated by models with routine labor disruption
costs, both with (blue line) and without (black dashed line) aggregate TFP shocks. In
both cases, introducing a nonconvex routine labor adjustment cost allows the model to
generate a stepwise decline in routine hours (Figure 1.14c) as well as large swings in overall
labor hours (Figure 1.14b). To see this, recall that nonconvex disruption costs generate
inaction zones in the routine hours decision rule, which then lead to long periods of inaction
interrupted with periodic and large downward adjustments that bring routine labor stocks
close to their long-run trend levels. Moreover, since nonroutine labor is a complement
for routine labor in final goods production and since the adjustment of nonroutine labor is
costless in the model, nonroutine hours also fall when routine hours adjust. Overall labor
hours, as a result, display infrequent but large swings in the model with long-run trends and
labor adjustment costs.
More importantly, aggregate productivity shocks can trigger these trend adjustments,
giving rise to concentrated declines of labor hours in recessions (compare the black dashed
lines and the blue solid lines in Figure 1.14). As the blue solid lines show, the model with
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Figure 1.14
Output and Labor Hours Over Business Cycles (1986-2014): Model with Labor Adjustment Cost
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nonconvex adjustment costs and TFP shocks is able to capture the timing of the last three
labor market downturns.
Furthermore, when there is a long-run reallocation trend, the sensitivity with which rou-
tine labor decisions adjust to productivity shocks changes over time; more specifically, it
increases as the gap between the existing stock of labor and the frictionless “target” grows
over time during the period of inaction, and declines each time after an adjustment.16 In
other words, given an initial state of the economy, a long-run reallocation trend and non-
convex adjustment costs together lead to periods with high likelihood of labor adjustment
and periods with low likelihood of labor adjustment. Figure 1.15 plots the estimated proba-
bility of adjustment for the period 1986-2014 and identifies three such cycles in the past 30
years, which have largely coincided with the business cycle.17 When the propensity to ad-
just is high, even a small negative TFP shock can trigger a large labor market downturn. In
this vein, the model explains why the small drop of output at the beginning of 2000, which
was not enough to cause a large recession, nevertheless triggered a large and prolonged
decline of labor hours that lasted several years, giving rise to the most severe example of a
jobless recovery.
16The “gap approach” is common in the labor adjustment cost literature (Caballero and Engel, 1993;
Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis, 2015). The gap approach studies the dynamics of labor adjustment as a
function of the gaps between firms’ labor choices under adjustment costs and the counterfactual frictionless
targets. The firm adjusts labor when the gap is large and remains in inaction when the gap is small. In
a stationary environment, the frictionless target fluctuates around a constant mean, so the sensitivity of the
adjustment decisions is constant.
17I simulate the model with routine labor disruption costs using 1000 randomly generated TFP series
(AR(1)). The simulation starts in 1983 as the stock of routine labor at that time is close to trend after having
adjusted during the 1982 recession. Each TFP series generates a stepwise declining path of routine hours,





1.6 The Decline of Labor in the 2000s
A competing explanation for the divergence between routine and nonroutine occupa-
tions and the decline of the overall labor share is globalization. Globalization, and off-
shoring in particular, is potentially associated with the divergence between routine and
nonroutine occupations because there is a moderate correlation between the “codifiability”
and the “offshorability” of a job. The idea is that routine-intensive tasks are well suited
for automation because they can be computerized and are also likely to be suitable for off-
shoring because they can be performed at a distance without substantial loss of quality.
However, an important difference remains, as codifiability is about whether a task can be
broken down into a set of pre-fixed procedures and produced cost-effectively by a com-
puter or a machine, while offshorability is about whether physical proximity is essential
in performing a sequence of tasks. For example, software engineering is a nonroutine but
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highly offshorable job, while being an inspector on an assembly line is routine but not off-
shorable. The correlation between a standard measure of offshorability and RTI is around
0.4 (Goos, Manning, and Salomons, 2014).18 In addition, offshoring is associated with
a declining labor share, as it induces a shift of capital intensity in domestic production:
as U.S. firms move their more labor-intensive production stages to China, the remaining
domestic production in the U.S. on average becomes more capital-intensive.
Some studies have argued that RBTC and trade play overlapping roles in driving the two
discussed labor market structural shifts. These two forces may also be mutually reinforc-
ing.19 However, a few recent papers have suggested that the effects of RBTC and trade on
the decline of labor’s share and the divergence between routine and nonroutine occupations
have been quite different: RBTC is much more important than offshoring in explaining the
divergence between routine and nonroutine occupations, while import competition and off-
shoring are more important than RBTC in driving the decline of overall employment and
labor’s share, especially after 2002 (see Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2015), Goos, Manning,
and Salomons (2014), Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2014), and Elsby, Hobijn, and
Şahin (2013) for details).20
Building on these insights, I extend the baseline model with RBTC to incorporate a no-
tion of offshoring without engaging in a full-blown trade model. Specifically, I introduce a
second form of technological change that augments a third type of capital, which I denote
as IMt. The key assumption is that IMt is more substitutable with both types of labor than
18For details on the construction of the measure for offshorability, see Blinder and Krueger (2013).
19RBTC and trade are mutually reinforcing, as the rise of offshoring owes largely to declining cost of
transportation and (especially) communication technologies, which makes it difficult to completely separate
the two processes. However, there is reason to believe that these interactions are of at most second-order
importance relative to their respective effect on the labor market (Acemoglu, Gancia, and Zilibotti, 2015).
20Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) also show that there is a shift away from routine occupations
toward nonroutine occupations within industries, but that RBTC also leads to significant between-industry
shifts in the structure of employment in 16 West European countries.
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standard non-IT capital in the aggregate production function; therefore I call this technol-
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in which Xim,t represents LSTC. The nested CES structure of the aggregate production
function (1.46) has several implications. First, it implies that IM capital is more substi-
tutable with labor (0 < γ < 1) than with non-IT capital, Kt, which is key to the role of
LSTC in depressing labor’s share. Second, since IMt can substitute for the entire task bun-
dle produced by IT capital and labor, LSTC does not induce divergence between routine
and nonroutine labor, as both types are equally substitutable by IMt. Last but not least,
LSTC decreases the share of IT capital in total income.
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(1.48)
The income share of IM capital is given by: sIM,t = (1− α)Θim,t, and the income shares
21In the context of offshoring, IMt can be thought of as imported intermediate goods. Another possible
empirical counterpart is intangible assets.
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of IT capital and the two types of labor are all scaled by (1−Θim,t).
I assume that the law of motion for IM capital is given by:
IMt+1 = g(Iim,t) = I
φ
im,t (1.49)
where Iim,t stands for investment in IMt+1. Parameter φ < 1 characterizes the produc-
tion function of new IM capital with diminishing marginal returns. Also, I assume that
the existing stock of IM capital depreciates fully after production, which is a harmless
simplifying assumption.22 The resource constraint in the economy is given by:
Yt = Ct + Ik,t + Im,t + Iim,t (1.50)
where investment Ik,t and Im,t are defined in the same way as in the main model. Everything
else not described here is the same as in the main model.
Analytical Results
Here I conduct comparative static analysis for the model with both LSTC and RBTC.
As in Section 1.3.3, the following propositions are derived from a simplified model without
non-IT capital, as non-IT capital accounts for a constant share, α, in the total income and
therefore does not affect the properties of the structural changes induced by exogenous
technological changes.
22The specification of equation (1.49) allows me to relate the model to offshoring more easily, as IMt+1
can be thought of as imported intermediate goods being produced by combining offshoring investment Iim,t
and foreign labor (not explicitly accounted for in this model) with a production technology like (1.49). How-
ever, a standard law of motion for capital, such as IMt+1 = Iim,t + (1 − δim)IMt, delivers essentially the
same results in the model.
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= −γ ·Θim,t < 0 (1.53)
for 0 < ε < 1, σ < 0, and 0 < γ < 1.
Proof. See online Appendix.
Proposition 1.6.1 states that LSTC does not induce labor to flow between routine and
nonroutine sectors; it increases the share of the IM capital in total income, and decreases
the shares of labor – routine, nonroutine, and overall – and IT capital in total income. This
result qualitatively establishes that LSTC can generate the additional decline of the overall
labor income share and the slowdown of the nonroutine labor income growth observed in
the data after 2002.























for 0 < ε < 1, σ < 0, and 0 < γ < 1.
Proof. See online Appendix.
Proposition 1.6.2 asserts that even when IM capital is present, RBTC continues to
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induce a U-shaped path for the overall labor income share, as long as the initial IM capital
share is relatively low (sIM,0 < ε/γ). This mild condition stems from the dual effects of
RBTC in this model: within the task bundle YML,t produced by IT capital and labor, RBTC
induces divergence between routine and nonroutine labor and raises the income shares of
nonroutine labor and IT capital relative to routine labor. Because YML,t is a substitute for
IM capital, RBTC also raises the overall income share of YML,t, which in turn raises the
income shares of IT capital and both types of labor, relative to IM capital. For nonroutine
labor, the two effects work in the same direction and RBTC unambiguously increases the
share of nonroutine labor in total income. However, for routine labor, the first effect of
RBTC is negative while the second effect is positive; as a result, RBTC has an ambiguous
effect on the share of routine labor in total income when IM capital is present. Only when
the second effect is relatively small, e.g., when the IM capital share is low, does RBTC
depress the routine labor income share and consequently induce a U-shaped pattern for the
overall labor share. This result implies that countries with different IM capital shares may
see different effects of IT growth/RBTC on the labor income share.
Propositions 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 establish that LSTC and RBTC have different implications
for long-run movements of factor shares. While RBTC induces a U-shaped path of labor’s
share, LSTC generates a path that is monotonically declining. The ultimate path of sL,t
therefore depends on the relative sizes of these two exogenous forces. Under an empirically
reasonable assumption that LSTC will abate much sooner than RBTC, the overall labor
share will follow a U-shaped path with a delayed turnaround.
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Numerical Experiment
Propositions 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 have established analytically that the model with LSTC
and RBTC can generate factor share movements that are qualitatively consistent with the
data. In this section, I assess the model’s quantitative performance. I find that when cali-
brated using trade data, the model delivers very little additional decline of the overall labor
share or slowdown of the nonroutine labor share. This provides tentative evidence sug-
gesting that trade alone cannot quantitatively explain the accelerated decline of labor after
2002, which is consistent with the findings by Eden and Gaggl (2014). However, more
rich open-economy models with amplification mechanisms for LSTC may have different
quantitative implications.The closed-economy setup is subject to a second caveat. In the
closed-economy model, the income of IMt is treated as part of total income. In reality, the
value added from imported intermediates is not part of domestic income, which means that
the decline of the shares of labor and IT capital under LSTC within the domestic economy
is further dampened in the model by national accounting. I leave possible interpretations
and extensions to future research.
Figure 1.16
Calibrated LSTC Process
Here I proceed as follows. To illustrate the working of the model, in the following
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numerical exercise, I simply pick the part of the parameter space that allows me to obtain
a good match for the data, and I choose reasonable parameter values whenever possible.
In particular, I set the parameter γ = 0.75, which implies an elasticity of substitution of 4
between IM capital and the task bundle produced by IT capital and labor, which is in the
range of estimated import elasticities of substitution. I choose φ = 0.6, which is roughly
equal to the capital income share in China. I choose λim = 0.133 to set the initial share
of IM to be 0.03. I then feed the model with the exogenous RBTC process used in the
main model and the LSTC process depicted in Figure 1.16. The range of the LSTC growth
is approximately consistent with the import penetration ratio of China, but with a much
sharper kink at 2002. In fact, in this numerical exercise, I assume that RBTC starts at the
beginning of the simulation, while LSTC does not start until 2002, which is around the
time that China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).23 This assumption roughly
corresponds to the timing of important events: computerization started in the late 1970s and
was a major phenomenon in the 1980s-90s, while the rise of globalization and offshoring
did not become a significant event until the 2000s. The remaining parameter values are
calibrated using the same targets as in the benchmark model.
Figure 1.17 shows that under this parameterization, the model with RBTC and LSTC
can match the entire path of the overall labor share, as well as the divergence between
routine and nonroutine income shares. In particular, as the decomposition shows, RBTC
drives the divergence between routine and nonroutine labor shares and hours, while LSTC
generates equal percentage declines in both types of labor inputs and income shares. This
simultaneous dampening on routine and nonroutine labor leads to a decline of overall labor
23China joined WTO in December 2001.
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Figure 1.17
Medium-Run Factor Income Shares: RBTC + LSTC
Figure 1.18
Long-Run Factor Income Shares: RBTC + LSTC
67
Figure 1.19
Long-Run Output and Labor Hours: RBTC + LSTC
input and the labor income share. Moreover, the model with LSTC generates a decline in
the income share of IT capital, which is consistent with the data after 2002.
Figure 1.18 shows that in the long run, the overall labor share will decline much further
with prolonged exogenous LSTC than without. Under the specific LSTC process depicted
in Figure 1.16, the labor share does turn around before stabilizing at a permanently lower
level in the long run. but the timing is delayed. Moreover, the decline of the overall
labor share is driven primarily by a decline and then slower growth of the nonroutine labor
income share. At the same time, LSTC sharply depresses the income share of IT capital as
IM-capital crowds out IT investments. Finally, Figure 1.19 shows that LSTC contributes to
output growth while dampening labor inputs on all fronts.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this study, I study the impact of IT progress, i.e., Routine-Biased Technological
Change (RBTC), on the US labor market. I incorporate unbalanced growth in an otherwise
standard neoclassical growth model and study both analytically and quantitatively the role
of IT growth/RBTC in driving two well-documented labor market trends: the divergence
between routine and non-routine workers in terms of employment and income shares, and
the decline of the overall labor income share relative to capital. The first contribution of the
paper is to show that RBTC induces a U-shaped growth path for the overall labor share of
income, as well as a declining elasticity of substitution between capital and overall labor.
On the empirical front, this novel feature of RBTC helps account for the recent decline of
labor share in the data, while making an interesting forecast about the future trajectory of
the aggregate labor share. On the theoretical front, this finding contributes to the ongoing
debate on capital-labor substitutability by providing a dynamic perspective.
Quantitatively, I find that on the aggregate level, RBTC can account for nearly all the
divergence between routine and non-routine labor in terms of employment and income
shares in the U.S. in the period 1986-2014. RBTC can also account for the mild decline
of the overall labor share in the period 1986-2002, but cannot explain the acceleration of
the decline after the 2000s. Circumstantial evidence suggests that globalization may have
played a much larger role than technology in the 2000s in causing the sharp fall of overall
labor share. However, my preliminary analysis within a closed-economy, representative-
agent framework is inconclusive on the matter.
Last but not least, when short-run frictions are present and labor adjustments are not
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instant, there are interesting interactions between secular trends and business cycles. I ex-
plore this property of RBTC in the representative-agent model and find that, in the presence
of nonconvex routine labor adjustment costs, the model generates a stepwise decline in rou-
tine labor hours and large swings in overall labor hours, which is qualitatively consistent
with the data. More interestingly, the timing of these inevitable trend adjustments can be
significantly affected by aggregate productivity shocks and therefore concentrated in reces-
sions. In future work, I plan to embed RBTC and labor adjustment costs in a heterogeneous
firm model to study further the links between the secular trend and business cycles.
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Chapter 2: Loss Aversion and Business Cycle Asymmetries
2.1 Introduction
Economic Research suggests that business cycles are asymmetric (Acemoglu and Scott,
1997; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2006; among others): contractions are found to
be sharper and more violent than expansions (McKay and Reis, 2008); economic activ-
ity can stagnate in recessions for a prolonged period of time (Chamley and Gale, 1994);
and negative shocks generate more persistent dynamics in aggregate variables than pos-
itive shocks (Aruoba, Bocola, and Schorfheide, 2012). However, the standard Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model cannot account for these empirical findings
on asymmetries. The goal of this study is to explore the role of loss aversion in generating
asymmetric dynamics in consumption and labor hours over business cycles.
The notion of loss aversion was first introduced to economics by Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979) as part of their famous prospect theory. A descriptive model of decision making
under uncertainty, prospect theory states that people compare their well-being to a ref-
erence point (“reference-dependence”) and derive utility (disutility) from the gain (loss).
Loss aversion refers to the fact that the disutility from a loss is greater than the utility from
a gain of the same amount. In addition, prospect theory asserts that people are risk-loving
in the realm of loss and risk-averse in the realm of gain, a phenomenon known as the
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“reflection effect”. Prospect theory can be summarized in an S-shaped, piecewise utility
function centered at the reference point with slopes in the local region of loss much steeper
than those in the region of gain (Figure 2.1). This utility function is often called “gain-loss
utility” in the literature. It contrasts with the traditional consumption utility function, which
assigns values to absolute levels of wealth and consumption, does not distinguish between
loss and gain, and is everywhere concave.1
Figure 2.1
Prospect Theory: Gain-Loss Utility Function
Besides the vast evidence from studies in cognitive and behavioral psychology, the pres-
ence of loss aversion in decision making has been confirmed repeatedly in empirical studies
in economics. In particular, Camerer (2003) lists ten field phenomena that are inconsistent
with Expected Utility (EU) theory and consistent with cumulative prospect theory (i.e. loss
aversion and the reflection effect). Shea finds evidence in household (1995a) and aggre-
gate (1995b) data that consumption rises today when expected future income rises but does
1The traditional consumption utility can be viewed as taking level zero as a fixed reference point.
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not fall today when expected future income falls, suggesting the presence of loss aver-
sion in household and aggregate consumption choices. More recently, Rosenblatt-Wisch
(2008) estimates the inter-temporal Euler equation under prospect theory using Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) and finds evidence of loss aversion in aggregate consumption
data. Tovar (2009) studies the effects of loss aversion on trade policy, and show that loss
aversion can explain why a disproportionate share of trade protection goes to declining
industries.
On the theory front, loss aversion has been used to explain various asset pricing anoma-
lies, including the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle. Benartzi and Thaler
(1995) build a partial equilibrium model and show that if investors are loss averse and
monitor their portfolios frequently (”myopia”), a high equity premium is then required to
compensate them for the volatility in stock returns. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)
study loss averse investors in a general equilibrium endowment economy. Their model is
successful in generating the high mean, excess volatility and predictability of stock returns,
as well as the correlation of stock returns with consumption growth observed in the data.2
Intuitively speaking, loss aversion has two key implications. The first is that loss averse
agents are highly risk averse around the reference point.3 Under uncertainty, incomplete
markets and a frequently updated reference point, a loss averse agent also exhibits strong
motives for precautionary saving, as she will optimally choose to build a buffer stock to
avoid having consumption fall below the reference level. In other words, loss aversion im-
2Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) assume time-varying loss aversion. That is, previous performance
affects the degree of loss aversion in the current period. This assumption is built on the behavioral evidence
of Thaler and Johnson (1990) and is necessary in generating their results.
3By assuming time-varying loss aversion, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) extend the prospect theory
and have loss averse agents become less risk averse after good investment performance. But the “baseline”
loss-aversion still implies monotonically higher risk aversion.
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plies a high curvature in the overall utility function. The second key implication of loss
aversion is asymmetry: loss averse consumers have asymmetric responses to positive and
negative income shocks.4 Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) prove these two points in a
two-period consumption-saving model. They show that when there is sufficient income un-
certainty, a loss-averse person resists lowering consumption in response to bad news about
future income, and the resistance is greater than the resistance to increasing consumption in
response to good news. These predictions are at odds with the permanent income hypoth-
esis, but are consistent with the empirical evidence on asymmetric consumption behavior
found by Shea (1995a,b).
Despite its success in explaining asset pricing anomalies and Bowman, Minehart, and
Rabin’s early attempt to incorporate it into the consumer choice problem, the application
of loss aversion in macroeconomic theory overall is limited. One notable exception is a
recent paper by Santoro, Petrella, Pfajfar, and Gaffeo (2014) in which the authors show that
loss aversion can be used to explain the asymmetric transmission mechanism of monetary
policy over business cycles. Nevertheless, there has not been a systematic treatment of loss
aversion in the standard infinite-horizon Real Business Cycle (RBC) framework. In this
study, I fill this gap by asking and answering the following questions: Can loss aversion be
reconciled with business cycle facts? What are its qualitative and quantitative implications
in an otherwise standard RBC framework? Can the fundamental asymmetry built into loss
4The other feature of prospect theory, “the reflection effect”, implies something distinctively different
from loss aversion. In particular, it implies diminishing sensitivity in both gain and loss, and this property
mainly affects the course of local (inter-temporal in our context) adjustments. For example, if one uses
lagged consumption as the reference point, risk-seeking in the realm of loss means that the agent is better
off concentrating a doomed loss in one period, rather than spreading it out over multiple periods; this is in
contrast with the region of gain, in which agents are risk averse and prefer to smooth adjustments to take
advantage of the high marginal utilities period by period, a property well-understood in the habit formation
literature.
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aversion help explain (some of) the asymmetries of business cycles found in the data?
To answer these questions, I embed loss aversion into an otherwise standard RBC
model. I find that how loss aversion affects business cycle dynamics depends critically
on the nature of the reference point. If lagged consumption (i.e. status quo) is used as the
reference point, loss aversion dramatically lowers the effective inter-temporal rate of sub-
stitution and causes extremely high local risk aversion around the reference point, which
is in turn determined in equilibrium. In an otherwise frictionless RBC environment with
labor and production, consumers adjust to productivity shocks through the labor-leisure
channel and smooth consumption to the extreme. In other words, I find that loss aver-
sion under status-quo-reference (or any reference that is closely correlated with the lagged
choice itself) implies excessive consumption smoothing and hence cannot be reconciled
with business cycle facts in a simple RBC framework.5
In contrast, if the reference point is fixed at a constant level, loss aversion induces a flat
region in consumption decision rules and stagnation at the reference level in consumption
paths. When the reference point is close to the deterministic steady state consumption, the
presence of loss aversion will discourage people from lowering consumption in response
to negative shocks, but will not discourage them from raising consumption in response to
positive shocks. As a result, consumption will not exhibit excessive smoothness under a
fixed reference point. I show that loss aversion in consumption with a fixed reference point
improves the simple RBC model in terms of reducing the correlation between output and
consumption, and between output and hours. Under this framework, I am able to generate
asymmetric impulse responses of consumption to positive and negative shocks.
5A similar result holds for habit formation. See Lettau and Uhlig (2000).
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I next extend the model to incorporate loss aversion in leisure with a fixed reference
point, and investigate the resulting impact on business cycle dynamics. I find that when loss
aversion is imposed jointly on the consumption-leisure composite good, it does not affect
the intra-temporal margin, and both consumption and labor hours adjust to keep the utility
above its reference point. Therefore, loss aversion hardly affects business cycle dynamics
and does not induce asymmetric impulse responses of consumption or hours. On the other
hand, when loss aversion is imposed on consumption and leisure separately, i.e. double
loss aversion, it induces a flat region in the decision rules of both consumption and leisure.
With loss aversion in leisure, hours become much less volatile and consumption is slightly
more volatile than without loss aversion in leisure. In addition, both consumption and hours
exhibit asymmetric impulse responses to positive and negative productivity shocks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I formalize the notion of
loss aversion and describe the properties of the gain-loss utility. In section 2.3, I study loss
aversion in consumption in a simple RBC model and solve the model using two different
types of reference points. In section 2.4, I extend the model to incorporate loss aversion
in leisure in two ways and repeat the analysis. In section 2.5, I discuss the literature on
asymmetric business cycles and how loss aversion can potentially explain business cycle
asymmetries. In section 2.6, I offer some concluding remarks.
2.2 Loss Aversion
In this section, I formalize the notion of loss aversion and describe the properties of the
gain-loss utility function. For simplicity, I restrict attention to loss aversion in consumption
only. It should be obvious that a similar formulation of loss aversion can apply to any
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choice that affects utility directly, including leisure, which I will discuss later.
To incorporate loss aversion into the traditional consumption-based model, I first as-
sume that the total utility of a loss averse consumer is a weighed sum of two components:
U(c, x) = (1− θ)u(c) + θv [u(c)− u(x)] (2.1)
Here u(.) is a standard utility function (i.e. strictly increasing and concave) of consumption
c, and v(.) is the gain-loss utility whose properties will be specified below. x is some
reference consumption level. Parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] controls the relative importance of the
gain-loss utility, and when θ = 0, we are back to the standard consumption utility case.
Following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)6, I assume that the gain-loss utility depends on the
difference in the relative consumption utility, u(c) − u(x). This assumption provides a
normalization to the second term in the utility function to keep it comparable to the first
term. An alternative setup is to assume that the gain-loss utility is based directly on the
consumption gap: v(c−x). Since preference is ordinal, as long as v(.) and u(.) are strictly
increasing the two specifications are equivalent, although the exact specification does affect
the interpretation of the parameter θ.
2.2.1 Piecewise-linear gain-loss utility function
Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999) provides a theoretical framework for studying the
properties of the gain-loss utility. In particular, they show that a gain-loss utility function
v(.) should satisfy the following assumptions:
6Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) develop a general class of reference-dependent models which encompasses
neoclassical consumption utility with the gain-loss utility of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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1. Monotonicity: v(z) is continuous and strictly increasing for all z ∈ R, where v(0) =
0.
2. Diminishing sensitivity: v(z) is twice differentiable for all z 6= 0, v′′(z) ≤ 0 for all
z > 0, and v′′(z) ≥ 0 for all z < 0.




Tversky and Kahneman’s cumulative prospect theory (1992) suggests that the gain-loss
utility takes the form of a power function:
v(z) =

zα if z ≥ 0
−λ(−z)β if z < 0
where z denotes gain or loss, λ is the loss aversion coefficient, and α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1)
control the degree of the reflection effect (i.e. concavity in the region of gain and convexity
in the region of loss). Their experimental results suggest that α = β = 0.88. As theses
estimates are not too far away from unity, many applications of prospect theory choose to
abstract from curvature to keep the analysis simple (Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001).
Here I follow suit and make the same assumption. That is, I assume a piecewise-linear
function with a kink at the origin:
v(z) =

z if z ≥ 0
−λ(−z) if z < 0
(2.2)
where λ > 1 is the loss aversion coefficient. In controlled experiments, λ has been esti-
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mated to be within the neighborhood of [2, 2.5], and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) suggest
a point estimate of λ = 2.25. Tovar (2009) uses data on trade policy and estimates the loss
aversion parameter to be 2, consistent the experimental data.7




1 if z > 0
λ if z < 0
(2.3)
which embeds asymmetry. But it is important to note that marginal utility is not defined at
z = 0, as it jumps from 1 to λ when z becomes negative. This discontinuity is the key to
many of the most important implications of loss aversion, as well as being the main source
of analytical difficulties involved in solving the model. Nevertheless, assuming piecewise-
linearity greatly simplifies the algebra, as this formulation isolates the implications of loss
aversion from those of the reflection effect. Moreover, since such a gain-loss utility function
is globally concave, it guarantees an interior solution to the optimization problem.
If one further assumes that the reference point, x, is exogenously given, then the marginal




= [(1− θ)u′(c) + θv′(∆u|x)u′(c)]
=

u′(c) if c > x
[1 + θ(λ− 1)]u′(c) if c < x
7There is some evidence that the parameter is slightly lower than 2 in aggregate data (Rosenblatt-Wisch,
2008).
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where ∆u|x = u(c) − u(x). Once again, the marginal utility is not defined at c = x.
This clean representation illustrates the implications of loss aversion: when consumption
is well above the reference level, i.e. when one is in the region of gain, the presence of
loss aversion does not affect local decisions as the marginal utilities are the same as in the
standard case, regardless of the degree of loss aversion; loss aversion only affects marginal
utility and decisions when consumption is below the reference level, i.e. when one is in
the region of loss. Loss aversion has the strongest influence on local decisions when one
is close to the reference point. In particular, at the reference point, the marginal utility
jumps from u′(c) to (1 − θ + θλ)u′(c), creating potential discontinuities or flat regions in
consumption decision rules, as I show below.
2.2.2 Reference points
The nature of the reference point turns out to have a critical effect on how loss aversion
affects the dynamics in a general equilibrium model. Unfortunately, the original prospect
theory provides little guidance on the choice of reference point, and research on the na-
ture of reference points themselves is limited. Therefore, in this study, I experiment with
different specifications of the reference point and explore their distinct implications.
The simplest reference point to use in terms of modeling and computation is a fixed
non-zero reference point. Under this specification, the reference point enters the model as a
parameter and the value of this parameter matters critically for the direction of asymmetries
generated by loss aversion.
The most common assumption on the reference point in existing literature is the status
quo. In the standard consumption-saving problem in macroeconomics, the status quo is
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the previous-period consumption, which is then updated period-by-period. As in the habit
formation literature, one can choose to use an internal reference (e.g. lagged own con-
sumption) or an external reference (e.g. lagged aggregate consumption), or a mixture of
both. Using lagged consumption in our model has the advantage of being consistent with
the habit formation literature, but it adds a state variable and creates some computational
issues in our context.8 I will discuss these issues and solve the model under this type of
reference point later in Section 2.3.4.
Before we move on to the next section, note that one can also use lagged expected
consumption as a reference point (Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001; Kőszegi and Rabin,
2006). That is, the current choice poses a gain if it exceeds the previous expectations, and
a loss if it falls short. This specification would potentially bring my model closer to the
literature on “disappointment aversion” (Gul, 1991), in which the reference point is usually
assumed to be the certainty equivalent of future utility. Despite the obvious interest in using
this type of reference point, it poses significant computational challenge in a macro DSGE
framework. Therefore I leave it for future work.
2.3 Loss Aversion in Consumption
In this section I embed loss aversion in consumption choices into an otherwise standard
RBC model and explore its business cycle implications. I use the composite total utility
function and piecewise-linear gain-loss utility as discussed in the previous section.
8In the finance literature on habit formation, it is commonplace to assume a slow-moving reference point,
following Campbell and Cochrane (1999). That is, habits are assumed to be a geometric sum of past con-
sumptions, which introduces persistence in the reference point. However, in the macro-theoretical applica-
tion of habit formation, in particular, under the “standard” DSGE framework (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007), the common assumption on habits is to use a fraction of the lagged




A loss-averse representative consumer chooses consumption and labor in each period to






βt {(1− θ)u(ct) + θv [u(ct)− u(xt)] + χh(1− nt)} (2.4)
s.t ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt = wtnt + rtkt, ∀t (2.5)
Here I assume that the consumer’s total utility is comprised of three components: the
utility from flow consumption, u(ct); a gain-loss utility, v [u(ct)− u(xt)], with respect to
the difference between the utilities derived from the consumption choice and a reference
consumption point, xt, which will be specified later; and lastly, the utility from leisure,
h(1 − nt), which is assumed to be increasing and concave in (1 − nt). The parameter θ
governs the weight of the gain-loss utility relative to the pure consumption utility. The rest
of the notation is standard: kt is the capital stock at the beginning of period t, and nt is the
labor hours choice; wt and rt denote the marginal returns to labor and capital, respectively,
and parameter δ is the capital depreciation rate.
If one assumes that the reference consumption xt is external, as I do in this study,
then the inter-temporal Euler equation and the intra-temporal optimality condition for the
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consumer’s problem are given respectively by:
[1− θ + θv′(∆ut|xt)]u′(ct) = βEt {[1− θ + θv′(∆ut+1|xt+1)]u′(ct+1) (rt+1 + 1− δ)}
(2.6)
wt = χ ·
h′(1− nt)
[1− θ + θv′(∆ut|xt)]u′(ct)
(2.7)
where ∆ut|xt = u(ct)− u(xt). Once again, v′(.) is not defined when u(ct) = u(xt).
Production





t and maximizes profits. In equilibrium its optimality conditions pin down prices
in factor markets:
rt = ztfk(kt, nt) (2.8)
wt = ztfn(kt, nt) (2.9)
Exogenous TFP shocks
I assume that aggregate TFP follows an AR(1) process:
log(zt) = ρz log(zt−1) + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2z) (2.10)
Finally, the resource constraint of the economy is given by:
ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt = ztf(kt, nt) (2.11)
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2.3.2 Calibration
Since the main goal of this study is to investigate the properties and implications of loss
aversion, I keep the rest of the model entirely standard and use the no-loss-aversion case
(θ = 0) as a benchmark when choosing values for the conventional RBC parameters. I then
add loss aversion to the model by increasing the value of θ.
Specifically, I first consider the following functional forms for the consumption and
leisure utility:
u(ct) = log(ct) (2.12)
h(1− nt) = log(1− nt) (2.13)
Since I assume separable utility in consumption and leisure throughout this study, using
log utility ensures that the baseline model satisfies the long-run regularity conditions on
preferences in the RBC literature (King and Rebelo, 1999).
I assume that the time period in the model is one quarter. There are eight parameters in
the model to be calibrated, among which six are conventional preference and technology
parameters. These include the discount factor β, capital’s share in production α, the capital
depreciation rate δ, the weight of the utility from leisure in total utility, χ, and the persis-
tence and volatility levels of the aggregate TFP shock, ρz and σz. For these parameters
I pick values that match my baseline model to the long-run moments in the post-war US
data. The specific calibration targets used for each parameter and the parameter values are
listed in Table 1. As mentioned before, the practice thus far is entirely standard.
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Table 2.1
Calibration of RBC model with Loss Aversion
Parameters Values Calibration Targets or Sources
β: Discount Factor 0.99 Annual real interest rate = 4%
α: Capital Share in Production 0.33 Average labor share of income = 0.67
δ: Capital Depreciation rate 0.025 Annual investment-to-capital ratio = 10%
χ: Relative weight of leisure utility 1.778 Long-run average labor hours = 0.33
ρz: Persistence of TFP shock 0.974 Empirical estimation
σz: Volatility of TFP shock 0.009 Empirical estimation
λ: Degree of loss aversion 2.25 Experimental evidence
Two additional parameters are specific to our model. The first is λ, which governs the
additional weight on loss relative to gain within the gain-loss utility. The other parameter
θ governs the weight of the gain-loss utility relative to the standard consumption utility.
Although these two parameters have distinct economic meanings, their values cannot be
individually determined under in my model, where loss aversion affects the marginal utility
by a factor of (1 − θ + θλ). My calibration strategy here is to use the point estimate of
λ = 2.25 from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) throughout the numerical analysis, and
experiment with different values of θ to see how the degree of loss aversion affects the
business cycle dynamics.
2.3.3 Fixed Reference point
In this first exercise, I assume the most simplistic form of reference point – a fixed
reference point for all consumption choices – and solve the model with value function
iteration. In particular, I choose the reference point to be x̄ = 0.7612, the deterministic
steady state level of consumption when there is no loss aversion (θ = 0) and a value that
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is also equal or close to the mean of the ergodic distribution of consumption in the model
economy with or without loss aversion. In other words, in the absence of loss aversion,
consumption choices are higher (lower) than this reference level under positive (negative)
TFP shocks. I then introduce loss aversion into the model and study how it affects the
consumption and hours decisions.
Decision Rules for Consumption and Labor Hours
Figure 2.2
Decision Rules
Loss Aversion in Consumption
(x̄ = 0.7612, zt = 1)
Figure 2.2 shows the consumption and hours decision rules under various degrees of
loss aversion and Figure 2.3 shows the decision rules under various TFP shocks. As Figure
2.2 panel (a) shows, loss aversion in consumption induces a flat region at the reference
level in the consumption decision rules. This is a striking and intuitive result: loss aversion
implies very high local risk aversion around the reference point; given that the reference
point is fixed, consumption does not fall below the reference level, i.e. “into the loss re-




Loss Aversion in Consumption
(x̄ = 0.7612, θ = 0.1)
the steady state level, the agent keeps consumption at the reference level to avoid incurring
a loss in the gain-loss utility. In a model where hours are free to adjust, the agent increases
hours (Figure 2.2 panel (b)) as capital falls to maintain the reference consumption level.
The marginal benefit of doing so diminishes when capital becomes sufficiently low, and at
some point the consumption decision rule resumes its usual shape. The higher the degree
of loss aversion, the lower this border-line capital level, and the wider the flat region. In
contrast, when capital is high, we see little deviation of the consumption and labor decision
rules from the RBC benchmark. This is because loss aversion does not affect inter-temporal
choices in the region of gain.
When controlling for the degree of loss aversion (Figure 2.3), consumption is now only
weakly increasing in technology levels, due to the presence of the flat regions. Meanwhile,
labor hours decision rules are no longer monotonic in technology levels, as hours serve
as an adjustment channel for the corresponding consumption choices. As a result, hours




Loss Aversion in Consumption
(x̄ = 0.7612)
Figure 2.4 depicts a typical consumption path implied by this version of the model.
The path features periods of stagnation at the reference level. In addition, consumption
tracks the RBC benchmark closely in booms, but rarely falls below the reference level in
recessions unless the negative shocks are very large. These features can all be understood
from the shape of the decision rules.
Business cycle statistics
Table 2.2 presents business cycle statistics from the U.S. data, the benchmark RBC
model (θ = 0), and the model with loss aversion (θ > 0) with a fixed reference point of
0.7612. In calculating the empirical business cycle statistics (column 1), I use quarterly
data on U.S. economy in 1948Q1-2013Q1. All data are taken from the Federal Reserve
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Economic Data (FRED) website of the St. Louis Federal Reserve. Data are in real per
capita terms and detrended using the HP-filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
As Columns 3, 4 and 5 in Table 2.2 show, output, consumption, and hours are less
volatile under loss aversion, as there is higher effective risk aversion in the economy and
consumption is less responsive to negative technology shocks. The relative volatilities
of consumption and hours, however, are not much affected when compared to the RBC
benchmark. In terms of prices, it is well-known that the simple RBC model is unable to
match the moments in data and adding loss aversion does not improve the fit.9
In terms of cyclicality, loss aversion lowers the contemporaneous correlation with out-
put of hours significantly and that of consumption and real wages mildly. Note that these
changes are in the direction of realism. Lastly, introducing loss aversion in consumption
does not affect the persistence of macro variables in the model economy.
Asymmetric impulse responses
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 show the impulse responses of consumption and hours to
TFP shocks. In particular, Figure 2.5 plots the impulse response profile of consumption
and hours in time to a unit (σz = 0.009) positive TFP shock under various degrees of loss
aversion when the reference consumption is fixed at its deterministic steady state level.
The figure shows that the greater the degree of loss aversion, the lower the initial and peak
responses of consumption and hours.
9Loss aversion does not seem to affect the business cycle moments of the real interest rate at all, while
both the absolute and relative volatilities of real wages are higher under loss aversion. This can be understood
from equation (2.7), wt = χ · h
′(1−nt)
[1−θ+θv′(∆ut|xt)]u′(ct) , the intra-temporal optimality condition. The marginal
utility from the gain-loss utility function v′(.) is stepwise around the reference point and hence is volatile




Loss Aversion in Consumption with Fixed Reference Point
US Data RBC Loss Aversion
Variables (θ = 0) (θ = 0.1) (θ = 0.2) (θ = 0.3)
Standard Deviation
Output 1.69 1.69 1.37 1.29 1.28
Consumption 0.90 0.67 0.64 0.59 0.58
Hours 1.90 0.73 0.49 0.56 0.58
Investment 4.70 5.25 4.18 3.97 3.97
Wage 0.90 0.99 1.16 1.21 1.22
Interest Rate 0.40 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
TFP 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
Standard Deviation relative to Output
Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.53 0.40 0.47 0.46 0.45
Hours 1.12 0.43 0.36 0.44 0.45
Investment 2.76 3.12 3.07 3.09 3.11
Wage 0.53 0.59 0.85 0.94 0.96
Interest Rate 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
TFP 0.71 0.71 0.88 0.93 0.94
First-order Auto-Correlation
Output 0.85 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Consumption 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.75
Hours 0.90 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71
Investment 0.87 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Wage 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73
Interest Rate 0.42 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
TFP 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Contemporaneous correlation with Output
Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.76 0.93 0.85 0.84 0.83
Hours 0.88 0.97 0.60 0.35 0.32
Investment 0.79 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.96
Wage 0.10 0.99 0.94 0.90 0.90
Interest Rate 0.00 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
TFP 0.76 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.96
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Figure 2.5
Impulse Responses to unit Positive shocks
Loss Aversion in Consumption
(x̄ = 0.7612)
Figure 2.6
Impulse Responses to unit Positive and Negative shocks
Loss Aversion in Consumption
(x̄ = 0.7612)
Figure 2.6 provides a clear illustration of asymmetry, the major property that distin-
guishes loss aversion from habit formation. Recall that a loss averse consumer is less
willing to lower her consumption in response to a negative shock than to raise her con-
sumption in response to a positive shock. As a result, the profile of the impulse responses
of consumption and hours to a unit negative TFP shock is lower than that to a unit positive
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shock, both initially and at peak. 10 In addition, Figure 2.7 clearly shows that the magni-
tude of asymmetry in the initial responses of consumption and labor hours increases with
the size of the shock.
Figure 2.7
Initial Responses of Consumption and Labor Hours
Loss Aversion in Consumption
(x̄ = 0.7612)
Calibration revisited: the Role of the Reference point
The results above are obtained under a fixed reference point of 0.7612, the determin-
istic steady state of consumption, where positive (negative) shocks generate consumption
decisions above (below) the reference point when there is no loss aversion. Under this
reference point, loss aversion implies a reluctance to lower consumption in response to
negative shocks, and as a result, negative shocks induce lower impulse responses (initial
and peak) of consumption and hours than positive shocks. Moreover, the tendency to in-
crease consumption readily but to lower it reluctantly means that the ex post ergodic mean
of consumption will turn to be higher than the ex ante reference point.
10The impulse responses to negative shocks are reversed in sign to help compare the magnitude.
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It is worth noting that the direction of the asymmetry can be reversed if the reference
point is set higher. In particular, I find that if the reference consumption level is “unrealis-
tically” high such that the model economy only operates in the “loss region”, then negative
shocks can induce higher impulse responses (initial and peak) than positive shocks. Of
course, for a negative unit TFP shock to generate larger impulse responses than a positive
unit shock is at odds with the original idea of loss aversion, and thus I do not consider this
case in my model. Nonetheless, this feature can be understood from the shape of the deci-
sion rules: when the reference point is very high, only under very large positive shocks is
the presence of the reference point relevant for local dynamics, and the flat region around
the high reference point in the consumption decision rule means that consumption may not
rise with large positive shocks but will fall without constraint to negative shocks. As a
result, the ex post ergodic mean of consumption will be lower than the ex ante reference
point in this case.
There is a point where the ex post ergodic mean of consumption exactly coincides
with the ex ante reference point and the asymmetry in the consumption and hours impulse
responses will be completely muted. I call this critical reference point “the gain-loss-neutral
reference point”. Figure 2.8 shows the gain-loss-neutral reference points for each level of
θ. Unsurprisingly, the greater the degree of loss aversion, the higher the gain-loss-neutral
reference point.
To summarize, the direction of the asymmetry implied by loss aversion depends crit-
ically on the level of the reference point in this general equilibrium model. In terms of
modeling, this is a matter of parametrization. My choice in this study x̄ = 0.7612, as




in consumption-saving models (Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin, 1999) and the empirical
evidence (Shea, 1995a,b).
Last but not least, an alternative way to calibrate the model is to introduce an “impa-
tience” condition, i.e. lower β, such that the gain-loss-neutral reference point coincides
with the deterministic steady state level of consumption without loss aversion, i.e. 0.7612.
In other words, I compare a standard RBC model without loss aversion but with a stan-
dard value for discount factor (β = 0.99) to a model with loss aversion and with a lower
discount factor, in which I choose the discount factor so that the ex post ergodic mean of
consumption (which in the model is also the ex ante reference point) is the same as in the
standard RBC model. The “impatience” condition is an idea borrowed from the literature
on precautionary saving, and the qualitative results under this calibration strategy are sim-
ilar to those presented before. My results show that the higher the degree of loss aversion,
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the more impatient the agent needs to be for the gain-loss-neutral reference point to be at
0.7612, which also results in a lower ergodic mean of the aggregate variables in the model
economy.
2.3.4 Status quo as Reference point
In the previous section, I showed how loss aversion with a fixed reference point in
consumption generates a flat region in the decision rule, and causes asymmetric impulse
responses to positive and negative income shocks. The results are intuitive and clear. How-
ever, in reality and in the literature, fixed reference points are rare. In this section, I turn to
a much more commonly used reference point – the status quo. Specifically, I assume that
the loss averse representative consumer uses the one-period-lagged aggregate consumption
as her reference point in each period: xt = Ct−1, following the habit formation literature.
Status quo differs from a fixed reference point in two ways: first, it is a (past) choice
itself, and therefore will have dynamic implications in a general equilibrium framework;
and second, it is moving period by period. In this section, I first modify the model so that
it can be solved using local approximation, and then discuss the results.
Differentiable gain-loss utility function
As mentioned above, in order to apply local approximation around the steady state, the
objective function needs to be differentiable at that point. However, the gain-loss utility
in the objective function is by definition not differentiable at the reference point, which
under the assumption of status-quo reference equals exactly the steady state consumption
in equilibrium. To remedy this issue, I use a “smooth-switching” approximation of the
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gain-loss utility to make it everywhere differentiable, following Rosenblatt-Wisch (2008).
I use the following switching function to approximate the loss aversion coefficient:
λ̃(z) ≈ 1 + γ
1 + eµz
(2.14)
where z is the argument inside the gain-loss utility function. Note that the degree of loss
aversion λ̃ in this formulation is bounded by [1, γ + 1]. In particular, λ̃ → 1 for z → ∞
and λ̃ → (1 + γ) for z → −∞. Therefore, in the approximated gain-loss function, γ
is analogous to λ in that it governs the degree of loss aversion. The other parameter µ
controls the speed of switching: the higher µ is, the higher the speed of switching. The








Note that ṽ′(0) = 1 + γ
2
, whereas in the exact piece-wise gain-loss utility, v′(0+) = 1 and
v′(0−) = 1 + γ. However, as we move away from the reference point, a pair of γ = 1.25
and µ = 10000 gives a very good approximation of the piecewise-linear gain-loss utility
with λ = 2.25: Panel (a) of Figure 2.9 plots the difference between the piece-wise linear
gain-loss utility and its smooth-switching approximation. It is clear that the approximation
is nearly perfect everywhere except around the reference point, where the difference is still
well within 10−4.11 Panel (b) of Figure 2.9 plots the marginal utility of the piecewise-linear
utility function and that of the smooth-switching utility. We can see how the approximation
11Under our baseline calibration, the numbers which go inside the gain-loss utility v(.) are roughly of
magnitude 10−2. Therefore the smooth-switching function should provide a good approximation when the
status quo is used as reference point. This is confirmed by the sensibility of the results.
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is successful in capturing the sharp fall of the marginal utility around that point, the most
important feature of loss aversion.
Figure 2.9
Piecewise-linear vs. Smooth-switching Utility Functions
Steady state and Business cycle statistics
Now that the gain-loss utility function has been made differentiable everywhere by
the smooth-switching approximation, first order conditions pin down a unique steady state
for the model economy. Under the benchmark calibration, the higher the degree of loss
aversion, the higher the levels of capital, output, and consumption in this approximated
steady state. This is a sensible result, as the gain-loss utility increases the overall curvature
in the total utility function.
Table 2.3 reports the business cycle statistics of various real aggregate variables under
different degrees of loss aversion, with the first column reporting the statistics from the
US data. Again, the second column is obtained by solving the benchmark RBC model with
local approximation around steady state. The numbers presented there are slightly different
from the second column in Table 2.2, which were based on value function iteration. The
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differences simply reflect the change in the solution method.
The results suggest that once loss aversion is added to the model, consumption becomes
an order of magnitude smoother than without loss aversion. Even with a very low weight
such as θ = 0.05, the volatility of output falls sharply, the relative volatility of consumption
drops to near zero and consumption becomes acyclical. The intuition behind this strong re-
sult is that unlike the case of fixed reference points, the reference points used in this model
are determined in equilibrium by inter-temporal choices, in which case loss aversion im-
plies very strong local risk aversion and a very low inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
Not only are loss averse consumers reluctant to lower consumption in response to negative
shocks, they are also unwilling to raise consumption in response to positive shocks, because
they want to avoid incurring a loss in the next period. In a production economy where the
labor-leisure choice is free to adjust, loss averse consumers will optimally adjust to pro-
ductivity shocks by moving labor input in the opposite direction. As a result, consumption
becomes very unresponsive to aggregate shocks in general. Figure 2.10 shows the impulse
response functions of consumption and hours with and without loss aversion to a unit pos-
itive TFP shock. It is clear that the effect of loss aversion is very strong: the response of
consumption drops to near zero on impact and remains essentially flat thereafter. Hours
fall sharply in response to higher technology, suggesting very strong income effects. The
counter-cyclical labor supply contributes to the low volatility of output, and the relative
volatility of hours and wages are both doubled, reflecting the fact that all adjustments to
shocks in the economy go through the labor-leisure channel.
Loss aversion does not appear to affect the persistence in any variables other than con-




Loss aversion in Consumption with Status quo as Reference point
US Data RBC Loss Aversion
Variables (θ = 0) (θ = 0.05) (θ = 0.1) (θ = 0.3)
Calibration: χ 1.78 1.83 1.89 2.11
Standard Deviation
Output 1.69 1.70 0.81 0.76 0.73
Consumption 0.90 0.69 0.02 0.01 0.01
Hours 1.90 0.72 0.61 0.69 0.74
Investment 4.70 5.21 3.40 3.19 3.03
Wage 0.90 1.00 1.42 1.44 1.46
Interest Rate 0.40 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
TFP 1.20 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21
Standard Deviation relative to output
Output 1 1 1 1 1
Consumption 0.53 0.40 0.03 0.02 0.01
Hours 1.12 0.43 0.76 0.90 1.02
Investment 2.76 3.07 4.19 4.18 4.17
Wage 0.53 0.59 1.75 1.90 2.01
Interest 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
TFP 0.71 0.71 1.49 1.59 1.66
First-order Auto-correlation
Output 0.85 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.72
Consumption 0.79 0.79 0.97 0.97 0.97
Hours 0.90 0.72 0.77 0.76 0.76
Investment 0.87 0.79 0.72 0.72 0.72
Wage 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74
Interest 0.42 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.74
TFP 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
Contemporaneous correlation with output
Output 1 1 1 1 1
Consumption 0.76 0.94 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05
Hours 0.88 0.98 -0.94 -0.95 -0.95
Investment 0.79 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wage 0.10 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Interest 0.00 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.93
TFP 0.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Figure 2.10
Impulse Responses to unit Positive shocks
Loss Aversion in Consumption
Status-quo as Reference point
addition, the negative contemporaneous correlation of hours with output indicates counter-
cyclical labor supply in the model. This is not surprising: given that the real wage is
pro-cyclical and consumption is completely unresponsive to shocks, the consumer needs to
work more hours in recessions in order to maintain the consumption level. In other words,
the income effect is so strong under status-quo reference that the labor supply curve bends
backwards.
In an experiment not reported here, I use one-period-lagged own consumption as the
reference point (“internal reference”) and repeat the exercise. Note that under this setup,
the marginal utility of consumption involves future period terms, as now the consumer
takes into account the effect of her current-period choice on the reference point in the
future. Unsurprisingly, consumption becomes even smoother than in our baseline model,
as the effective inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is even lower.
This version of the model fails to generate quantitatively meaningful asymmetric im-
pulse responses. The reason is obvious: there is excessive smoothness in consumption
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caused by the agents’ reluctance to adjust consumption levels in either direction.
Comparison: Habit formation
When the status quo is used as the reference point, it is instructive to compare loss
aversion to habit formation. Two points can be noted. First, when the status quo is used as
the reference point, both loss aversion and habit formation lead to excessive consumption
smoothing in a frictionless RBC environment: Lettau and Uhlig (2000) embed habit for-
mation into a RBC environment and obtain extremely smooth consumption under a lagged-
consumption reference point. The resemblance is not surprising, as both loss aversion and
habit formation feature reference-dependence, which under concave preferences generates
incentives to smooth not only levels but also changes in levels. Therefore, both loss aver-
sion and habit formation induce extreme local risk aversion around the reference point and
a low effective inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
Second, the most important feature that distinguishes loss aversion from habit formation
is the fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses embedded in loss aversion. How-
ever, excessive smoothness prevents the display of any meaningful asymmetry under fast-
moving reference points. In other words, when the reference point is updated frequently
and tracks choices, reference-dependence dominates asymmetry in impulse responses. But
when the reference point is fixed at an appropriate level, as shown in the previous section,
consumption and hours exhibit quantitatively significant asymmetric impulse responses to
shocks. In contrast, habit formation does not imply such an asymmetry.
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2.4 Loss Aversion in Consumption and Leisure
2.4.1 Loss aversion in consumption and leisure: Jointly
In the previous sections, I showed how the labor-leisure choice works as an important
adjustment channel to allow consumption smoothing under loss aversion in consumption
only. In this section, I extend the model by introducing loss aversion to the consumption-
leisure composite good and investigate its business cycle implications.
The model
The total utility now takes the following form:
U(c, l, xc, xl) = (1− θ)u(c, l) + θv[u(c, l)− u(xc, xl)] (2.16)
where l = 1− n is leisure, and xc, xl are the reference points for consumption and leisure,
respectively.
The most significant difference between this version of the model and the previous
formulation is that once loss aversion is introduced into consumption and leisure choices
“jointly”, it no longer affects the contemporaneous rate of substitution between the two,
given that the reference consumption and the reference leisure are both external to the agent.





where wt is the real wage. Meanwhile, loss aversion continues to affect the inter-temporal
choice of the consumption-leisure composite good. The inter-temporal Euler equation is
given by:






[1− θ + θv′(∆ut+1|xt+1)]
∂u(ct+1, lt+1)
∂ct+1
(rt+1 + 1− δ)
}
except that now ∆ut|xt = u(ct, lt) − u(xct , xlt). I assume a fixed reference point for both
consumption and leisure so that I can solve the model with value function iteration under
exactly the same calibration as before.12 In particular, I use the steady state levels of con-
sumption and labor hours as the reference point: x̄c = 0.7612 and 1 − x̄l = 0.33. This
implies a reference utility level of u(x̄c, x̄l) = −0.985.
Results
Panel (a) and (b) of Figure 2.11 show the consumption and labor hours decision rules
for various degrees of loss aversion in consumption and leisure jointly. As panel (a) shows,
the consumption decision rules become flatter around the reference level, but are not com-
pletely flat as in the case of loss aversion in consumption only. This is because under
composite loss aversion, the effective reference point is not the reference consumption or
the reference leisure, but the reference utility u(xc, xl) = log(xc) +χlog(1− xl). As panel
(c) shows, the composite utility log(ct) + χ log(1 − nt) is indeed completely flat around
12Now that loss aversion does not enter the intra-temporal optimality condition, it is easier to evaluate the
auxiliary choice matrix of {ct, nt} given the {kt, zt} × kt+1 state-choice space, as these values no longer




Loss aversion in Consumption and Leisure: Jointly
(u(x̄c, x̄l) = −0.985, zt = 1)
this reference point of -0.985.
Since both consumption and labor hours can adjust to keep the composite utility from
falling below its reference level and loss aversion does not have much impact on either
the consumption or hours decision rules individually, the business cycle dynamics in this
model are not much affected by loss aversion, except that the volatility of consumption
turns out to be slightly higher and that of output and hours slightly lower than the RBC
benchmark (Table 2.4). Consumption and hours are both less pro-cyclical as compared to
the RBC benchmark, improving the fit of the model to the data. In addition, we do not see a
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significant increase in the volatility of wages in this model, as the gain-loss utility does not
affect the intra-temporal optimality condition stated in Equation 2.17. Finally, this model
fails to generate quantitatively significant asymmetric impulse responses of consumption
and hours under the current calibration.
2.4.2 Loss aversion in consumption and leisure: Separately
In the previous section, I introduced loss aversion in the consumption-leisure composite
good; in this section, I impose loss aversion on consumption and leisure separately. That is,
I assume a reference level of leisure below which the agent feels a sense of loss no matter
how high her consumption is.
The model
I assume that the total utility function has the following form:
U(c, l, xc, xl) = {(1− θ1)u(c) + θ1v [u(c)− u(xc)]}+χ
{





where l = 1− n is leisure, and xc and xl are reference consumption and reference leisure,
respectively. Parameter θ1 governs the degree of loss aversion in consumption, and θ2
governs that in leisure. The inter-temporal Euler equation and intra-temporal optimality
condition for the consumer’s problem are given by:
[1− θ1 + θ1v′(∆ut|xct)]u′(ct) = βEt
{[
1− θ1 + θ1v′(∆ut+1|xct+1)
]






Loss aversion in Consumption and Leisure: Jointly
US Data RBC Loss Aversion
Variables (θ = 0) (θ = 0.1) (θ = 0.2) (θ = 0.3)
Standard Deviation
Output 1.69 1.68 1.54 1.49 1.46
Consumption 0.90 0.67 0.84 0.91 0.96
Hours 1.90 0.73 0.57 0.53 0.52
Investment 4.70 5.24 4.25 3.98 3.84
Wage 0.90 0.99 1.05 1.07 1.09
Interest Rate 0.40 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
TFP 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
Standard Deviation relative to output
Output 1 1 1 1 1
Consumption 0.53 0.40 0.54 0.61 0.65
Hours 1.12 0.43 0.37 0.36 0.36
Investment 2.76 3.11 2.75 2.66 2.63
Wage 0.53 0.59 0.68 0.72 0.75
Interest 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
TFP 0.71 0.71 0.78 0.80 0.82
First-order Auto-correlation
Output 0.85 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Consumption 0.79 0.77 0.73 0.72 0.72
Hours 0.90 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.68
Investment 0.87 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Wage 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72
Interest 0.42 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
TFP 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Contemporaneous correlation with output
Output 1 1 1 1 1
Consumption 0.76 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.88
Hours 0.88 0.97 0.92 0.86 0.80
Investment 0.79 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.92
Wage 0.10 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96
Interest 0.00 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
TFP 0.76 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98
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wt − χ ·
[
1− θ2 + θ2v′(∆ht|xlt)
]
h′(lt)
[1− θ1 + θ1v′(∆ut|xct)]u′(ct)
(2.20)
where ∆ut|xct = u(ct)−u(xct) and ∆ht|xlt = h(lt)−h(xlt). I continue to use the piecewise-
linear gain-loss utility v(.), and solve the model with value function iteration under the
same calibration of parameter values. Again, I use the deterministic steady state consump-





Loss aversion in Consumption and Leisure: Separately
(x̄c = 0.7612, 1− x̄l = 0.33, zt = 1)
Figure 2.12 shows the consumption and labor hours decision rules and Figure 2.13
shows the impulse responses. Not surprisingly, introducing loss aversion in leisure sepa-
rately induces a flat region in the hours decision rules around its reference level for exactly
the same reason as before. As a result, hours are less responsive to shocks in this version
of the model than without loss aversion in leisure (e.g. θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0). Consumption
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Figure 2.13
Impulse Responses to unit Positive shocks
Loss aversion in Consumption and Leisure: Separately
(x̄c = 0.7612, 1− x̄l = 0.33)
features a narrower flat region around the reference level and is slightly more responsive
to shocks than when θ2 = 0. The reason is that hours no longer works as an adjustment
channel under loss aversion in leisure.
In terms of business cycle statistics (Table 2.5), hours become significantly less volatile
and less pro-cyclical as compared to the case of loss aversion in consumption only. Con-
sumption becomes slightly more volatile because hours no longer adjust freely. Real wages
are more volatile under loss aversion as the marginal utilities of the gain-loss-utilities of
both consumption and leisure affect the intra-temporal optimality condition (22), which
determines the real wage in the equilibrium.
Figure 2.14 shows the initial impulse responses of consumption and hours to shocks of
different sizes. As it shows, negative shocks induce higher responses of both consumption
and hours than positive shocks in this version of the model under the current calibration.
To understand this, suppose first that a negative shock hits and consumption and hours




Loss aversion in Consumption and Leisure: Separately
US Data RBC Loss Aversion
θ = 0 θ1 = 0.1 θ1 = 0.1 θ1 = 0.1 θ1 = 0.1
Variables θ2 = 0 θ2 = 0.05 θ2 = 0.1 θ2 = 0.2
Standard Deviation
Output 1.69 1.69 1.29 1.25 1.23 1.21
Consumption 0.90 0.67 0.63 0.70 0.74 0.74
Hours 1.90 0.73 0.44 0.32 0.13 0.09
Investment 4.70 5.25 4.02 3.72 3.42 3.37
Wage 0.90 0.99 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19
Interest Rate 0.40 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
TFP 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
Standard Deviation relative to Output
Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.53 0.40 0.49 0.55 0.61 0.61
Hours 1.12 0.43 0.34 0.26 0.10 0.07
Investment 2.76 3.12 3.12 2.97 2.79 2.78
Wage 0.53 0.59 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98
Interest Rate 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
TFP 0.71 0.71 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.99
First-order Auto-Correlation
Output 0.85 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Consumption 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.71
Hours 0.90 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.61 0.59
Investment 0.87 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71
Wage 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72
Interest Rate 0.42 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72
TFP 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Contemporaneous correlation with Output
Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.76 0.93 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.85
Hours 0.88 0.97 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.27
Investment 0.79 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92
Wage 0.10 0.99 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00
Interest Rate 0.00 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
TFP 0.76 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00
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Figure 2.14
Initial Responses of Consumption and Labor Hours
Loss Aversion in Consumption and Leisure: Separately
(x̄c = 0.7612, 1− x̄l = 0.33)
as falling hours imply rising leisure. When a positive shock hits, hours rise and leisure
falls, but falls less than it rises under negative shocks, due to loss aversion. As hours rises
less, consumption rise less under positive shocks than it falls under negative shocks. In
other words, under the current calibration, the loss aversion in leisure dominates that in
consumption, resulting in the pattern of asymmetry shown in Figure 2.14.
2.5 Discussion
Having discussed the dynamic implications of loss aversion under various specifications
in a simple RBC framework, I now discuss the literature on asymmetric business cycles and
how loss aversion may help explain asymmetry.
Following the discussion in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006), asymmetries in
business cycles can be categorized into three types. The first type is “level asymmetry” or
deepness asymmetry, which refers to asymmetry in the unconditional distribution of de-
trended aggregate variables. In terms of modeling, level asymmetry usually results from
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some type of external constraint. For example, Hansen and Prescott (2005) show that
booms are not as large a deviation from trend as recessions due to firm capacity constraints.
Kocherlakota (2000) assumes that credit constraints also bind during booms but not reces-
sions. As a result, large negative shocks can lead to large cuts in production since agents
cannot borrow, while positive shocks are attenuated using savings.
The second type is “delay asymmetry”, which refers to asymmetry in the timing and
duration of booms and recessions, in the sense that some aggregate variables, such as out-
put, may stagnate at the trough of an otherwise symmetric cycle. Chamley and Gale (1994)
generate delay asymmetry using irreversible investment in a game-theoretic environment.
In their model, at low levels of production, firms wait to produce until they have learned
other firms’ investment, which leads to an overall delay in economic recovery. In the labor
search-and-matching literature, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) features different rates of
job creation and job destruction. In their model, job destruction occurs immediately once
the value to the firm and the worker of being matched is negative, but job creation takes
place only with some probability. Thus employment can fall quickly and violently, but it
must expand slowly.
As this study shows, loss aversion provides a promising alternative mechanism to gen-
erate both level asymmetry and delay asymmetry in business cycles. Specifically, this study
shows that with a fixed reference point, loss aversion in consumption alone, or in consump-
tion and leisure separately, can generate asymmetric impulse responses (initial and peak)
of consumption and hours to income shocks, i.e. “level asymmetry”. Also, loss aversion
causes stagnation of consumption at the reference level, which could be regarded as “de-
lay” in recessions. Of course, the asymmetries I generate in this study are preliminary in
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the sense that they have shown clear patterns but do not yet fit the empirical data. However,
the potential of loss aversion to generate meaningful asymmetric dynamics similar to those
found in the data should be evident.
Lastly, the third type of asymmetry documented in the literature is “growth rate asym-
metry”, which refers to the unconditional distribution of changes in aggregate variables.
Growth rate asymmetry means that increases and decreases in aggregate variables have dif-
ferent distributions. Aruoba, Bocola, and Schorfheide (2012) used a structural quadratic
auto-regression and found that negative shocks generate more persistent dynamics in ag-
gregate variables than positive shocks in the years after 1984. In terms of modeling, growth
rate asymmetry is usually generated by assuming some type of asymmetric learning pro-
cess. Based on the findings of this study, loss aversion does not seem to generate significant
asymmetry in the convergence rate of the consumption impulse responses (i.e. positive and
negative impulse responses take about the same time to return to the steady state.) How-
ever, it would be interesting to explore the possible implications of loss aversion for growth
asymmetry in a more complex model framework.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies the business cycle implications of loss aversion in an otherwise
standard RBC framework. My results indicate that the nature of the reference point plays
an important role in determining how loss aversion affects business cycles. In the baseline
model of loss aversion in consumption only, loss aversion induces excessive consumption
smoothing under status-quo reference, which mutes the fundamental asymmetry implied by
loss aversion. By contrast, under a fixed reference point, loss aversion induces a flat region
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in the consumption decision rules and stagnation in consumption paths around the refer-
ence level, which lead to both moderate consumption smoothing and asymmetric impulse
responses to productivity shocks.
In terms of business cycle statistics, introducing loss aversion into a choice variable
(e.g. consumption and/or hours) lowers the volatility of that choice variable in business
cycles. In my modified RBC model, loss aversion improves the fit of the model to the data
by lowering the contemporaneous correlation of consumption and hours with output. Loss
aversion does not affect the persistence of aggregate variables.
Finally, one can ask whether it is appropriate to apply a behavioral element, like loss
aversion, to a representative agent model directly, as I do in this study. In some way,
this comes down to a question of aggregation, and to answer that question, one needs to
build a heterogeneous-agent model and study the aggregation dynamics. However, the
computation involved in solving such a model is likely to be difficult.
If we leave the issue of aggregation aside for the moment, and allow ourselves to view
loss aversion as no more than a modeling tool that economists can utilize to study the
aggregate economy, then the question becomes simple: can loss aversion offer a working
mechanism in macro models to generate the asymmetries we observe in business cycles?
The answer to this question is yes. As discussed above, loss aversion has the potential of
generating both level asymmetry and delay asymmetry in DSGE models, which currently is
largely missing in the existing literature. Although it remains unclear whether loss aversion
will generate realistic predictions for asymmetric business cycles after incorporating it into
a more complex model framework and fitting the model to the data, this study offers a
reason to be hopeful.
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